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1 Introduction: 
Theoretical and methodological challenges in the  
institutional economics of European agriculture  
Contemporary economic research on European agriculture has been confronted 
with at least two major policy challenges that continue to occupy top positions on 
the scientific agenda. The first has been the unexpected breakdown of the former 
socialist block with its tremendous implications for restructuring in the agri-food 
sector after 1989. Almost overnight, issues of economic organisation and institu-
tional reform in farming as well as up- and downstream markets were brought 
centre-stage. According to LERMAN et al. (2004, p. 13), about 139.7 million people 
living in rural areas of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet 
Union were affected by the collapse of socialised agricultural production. However, 
reform turned out to be long-lasting, and its success highly region-specific, as 
recent reviews by KOESTER (2005) or SWINNEN and ROZELLE (2006) document.
1  
The second challenge has been the fundamental re-organisation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU), which was triggered by 
the MacSharry reform of 1992. Agricultural markets throughout the (enlarging)  
Union have been liberalised, and policymakers have begun to replace the tradi-
tional market and price policy by decoupled payments to farmers. At the same 
time, the public became more and more aware that ‘food and fibre’ production is 
but one function of rural areas, and that a growing policy focus should be laid on 
conceptually more diversified and more structurally, environmentally, and terri-
torially oriented instruments for ‘rural development’ (AHRENS, 2004), among them 
credit policies. Not a small number of observers are regarding these types of policy 
measures as the future backbone of rural policy, although their optimal design 
appears to be still widely uncharted territory (SOTTE, 2005). 
Realising the enormous economic and social implications of these transformations, 
agricultural economists in Europe begun to question the usefulness of their estab-
lished analytical tools. Already before the previously described challenges gained 
momentum, the neoclassical orthodoxy had been criticised for its strong beha-
vioural assumptions, a too-narrow focus on well-functioning equilibrium markets, 
                                           
1  In the following, references contain no specific page numbers if they refer to the overall idea, 
content, or result of an article or monograph. Definitions, quotations, or other specific concepts, 
opinions, or results are commonly referred to with page references. 2 Introduction 
and a lacking awareness of institutional diversity in real-world situations (BRANDES, 
1985). In agricultural economics, there has long been a specific discontent with 
the inability to explain long-lasting income disparities, factor market imperfec-
tions, and delayed structural change in the farming sector. Transition to the market 
in CEE reinforced the need for a suitable theoretical framework to analyse organi-
sational matters not only in agriculture, but in rural areas in general. In line with 
overall trends of globalisation and political devolution, concerns were raised over 
what the appropriate role of government in fostering the economic development of 
these areas should be. New rural policy agendas in Europe brought up the question 
of how an appropriate conceptual framework for analysing them could look like 
(VAN HUYLENBROECK et al., 2004a). 
As a consequence, interest in approaches of a literature called ‘institutional eco-
nomics’ proliferated, which broadly includes the economic analysis of complex 
contractual relations, property rights, and more generally the rules of human inter-
action. As will be illustrated subsequently, concepts of this literature have, in the 
meantime, been fruitfully applied to current policy matters in the agri-food sector, 
and partly have even become accepted as mainstream. But do institutional econo-
mists rightly claim that their approach is wel l suited to address the leading is-
sues on the agricultural policy agenda? It is sometimes overlooked that institu-
tional economics is not a uniform and homogenous theory or model. Partly due 
to the inherent diversity of this literature, a number of theoretical and methodo-
logical challenges persist to which no satisfying answer has been found so far. 
While institutional approaches promise to overcome some of the shortcomings 
of the orthodox theoretical framework mentioned above, they have weaknesses 
of their own which become evident not the least in applications to real-world 
policy problems. 
This monograph is an exploration of the current state of institutional economics 
research on European agriculture. Our major aim is to investigate the prospects 
for theoretical and methodological progress in this field by studying specific 
conceptual challenges with concrete policy problems. In the introductory chapter, 
we provide a brief survey of some lines of research that have emanated within 
institutional economics, and attempt to identify a variety of challenges and contro-
versies that mark the frontier of current wisdom. Among the remaining chapters of 
the monograph, each aims at carrying further the discussion within a single one of 
those scientific ‘construction sites’. 
We commence with a review of the major theoretical approaches within con-
temporary institutional economics. A three-step procedure is followed: we first 
present the general theories and then discuss some motivations and applications 
in the field of European agriculture. The topics of the three following chapters are 
outlined in a final step.  Introduction  3 
1.1  The theoretical landscape of institutional economics 
There are no ‘objective’ criteria to delineate institutional from other economic 
theories, and what makes a theory ‘institutional’ may be a matter of debate. 
Whereas NORTH’s (1990, p. 3) definition of institutions as “rules of the game in 
a society or, more formally, […] the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” has gained widespread currency, there is no unique defini-
tion used by all researchers in the field.
2 At the same time, several authors use 
the term ‘new’ institutional economics as opposed to some ‘older’ institutional 
school (WILLIAMSON, 2000, p. 596). To guide the further exposition, we provide 
an ‘intellectual map’ of institutional economics in Figure 1-1. The figure is de-
fined by two axes, which we label ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ axis. These two 
dimensions are supposed to serve as a first structuring aid for classifying the 
theories. That most economic theories carry both positive and normative sub-
stance has long been acknowledged in the profession, but has also been a source 
of heated discussion and, at times, confusion.
3 The positive substance concerns 
description and explanation, or ‘what is’ and why, whereas the normative substance 
has implications for what is desirable or recommendable, or ‘what ought to be’. 
For our comparative examination of institutional theories, we follow BLAUG’s 
(1992, p. 121) recommendation to carefully distinguish between these two dimen-
sions. Each dimension is defined by two poles, which for the positive axis are 
deterministic and evolutionary, and for the normative axis are status-quo and 
utopian. 
It may be easiest to explain the location of each theory in relation to the orthodox 
standard, neoclassical economics.
4 Together with its normative branch, welfare 
economics, this standard takes a corner position in the southwest angle, because 
it is perceived as both based on a deterministic behavioural model and a utopian 
normative reference. The deterministic model is the homo economicus of the 
microeconomic mainstream, or what BOWLES (2004, p. 8) calls the ‘Walrasian 
paradigm’: 
                                           
2  Alternative definitions are discussed in VATN (2005, pp. 9-14). 
3  See the debate on the possibility of ‘freedom from value’ (‘Wertfreiheit’) in economics 
(BLAUG, 1992, pp. 112-134; PIES, 1993). 
4  We thus use the term ‘orthodoxy’ in the sense of WILLIAMSON (2004, p. 20) as denoting 
“textbook intermediate microeconomic theory”.  4 Introduction 
Figure 1-1:  Map of theories in institutional economics 
 
Note:  Vertical = positive axis, horizontal = normative axis. 
Source: Author’s  presentation. 
“The Walrasian approach represents economic behaviour as the solution 
to a constrained optimization problem faced by a fully informed indi-
vidual in a virtually institution-free environment. […] The passage of 
time is represented simply by a discount rate; people do not learn or 
acquire new preferences over time; institutions do not evolve. The actions 
of others are represented by nothing more complicated than a given 
vector of market-clearing prices […]. Property rights and other economic 
institutions are represented simply by a budget constraint.” 
Once these assumptions are spelled out, to find the locus of optimal choice is a 
matter of principally straightforward calculation – there is no room and time for 
‘clearing one’s mind’, spontaneity, reasoning, or deliberation, but also not for 
opportunism or renegotiation. 
On the normative axis, a “decentralised economy motivated by self interest and 
guided by price signals […]” typically defines a benchmark “that could be regarded 
in a well-defined sense as superior to a large class of possible alternative dispo-
sitions” (ARROW and HAHN, 1971, pp. v-vi, quoted in BOWLES, 2004, p. 208). 
This idea has established a “theoretical tradition in economics dating back to 
Arthur C. Pigou […] which examines inefficiencies in the allocation of resources 
for various areas of economic life. It is a central characteristic of welfare economics 
that economic outcomes derived from the basic neoclassical model are used as a 














or agency theory  Introduction  5 
on fully defined exclusive rights and costless transactions are called ‘inefficient’” 
(EGGERTSSON, 1990, pp. 20-21). Because its assumptions can never be approxi-
mated in the real world, the neoclassical model has been labelled ‘utopian capi-
talism’ by BOWLES (2004, p. 208), whose terminology is followed here.  
A first step away from the inherent determinism of the neoclassical orthodoxy is 
taken by a theoretical branch called (formal) ‘contract theory’ (FURUBOTN and 
RICHTER, 2005, pp. 199-290) or ‘agency theory’ (BAMBERG and SPREMANN, 1987). 
By retaining the basic homo economicus assumption, this literature introduces risk 
and asymmetric information into the analysis and motivates the emergence of 
institutions by a principal-agent relationship and incomplete contracting. Although 
often still static in nature, dynamic aspects are taken into account by distinguishing 
between pre- and post-contracting stages, for example in the form of adverse 
selection and moral hazard.
5 Explicitly dynamic approaches allow for reputation 
and renegotiation opportunities (BOLTON and DEWATRIPONT, 2005). Although less 
deterministic in positive terms, contract theory commonly retains the ideal of 
neoclassical economics as a normative point of reference. Adding constraints to the 
orthodox model may at best lead to a new criterion of ‘constrained’ or ‘second-
best’ efficiency, which acknowledges that some constraints may be unavoidable, 
but otherwise leaves the optimisation problem intact (FURUBOTN and RICHTER, 
2005, p. 525). 
A less formally oriented school in institutional economics argues that a major 
weakness of the neoclassical market model is its neglect of transaction costs, i.e. 
the costs of search and information gathering, bargaining and decision making, 
and supervision and enforcement of contracts (FURUBOTN and RICHTER, 2005, 
pp. 51-54). These costs, together with incentive structures created by varying 
property right schemes, are regarded as the ultimate rationale for the existence 
of differentiated institutional arrangements in what BARDHAN (1989, p. 4) calls 
the COASE-DEMSETZ-ALCHIAN-WILLIAMSON-NORTH (CDAWN) school, accor-
ding to its major contributors. These authors are also grouped under the heading 
of ‘transaction cost economics’. Compared to formal contract theory, more em-
phasis is laid on imperfect contracting due to bounded rationality and the speci-
ficity of transaction-relevant assets, which may require ex-post conflict resolution 
mechanisms. WILLIAMSON (2000, p. 597) points out that transaction cost economics 
is concerned with analysing (the change of) governance structures over longer time 
                                           
5  Both terms emerged within the literature on insurance markets and characterise situations 
in which the agent can use an informational advantage to the detriment of the principal. For 
example, in the adverse selection case, ill customers of insurance companies will buy more 
health insurance than well-off. In the moral hazard case, insured might undertake more 
risks than the uninsured (BOWLES, 2004, p. 250). If the information on illness and risks is 
private, a conflict of interest between principal and agent arises that cannot be contracted 
costlessly. The issue is taken up again in Section 3.3. 6 Introduction 
periods than agency theory. We consider this a further step away from the static 
worldview of neoclassical economics. 
Building on COASE (1960), writers of this tradition have suggested that transaction 
costs could also be regarded as a normative criterion to evaluate which types of 
institutions are desirable. FURUBOTN and RICHTER (1991, p. 11) characterise this 
approach as follows: “It is argued that, given the cost of production and organiza-
tional knowledge, individuals seeking their own welfare will tend to choose an 
organizational structure (i.e., an institution) that minimizes transaction costs.” 
The transaction cost minimising institution is the most ‘efficient’ and thus most 
desirable one: “Since an efficient outcome would be achieved under any institu-
tional or organizational arrangement in the absence of transaction costs, the merits 
of alternative arrangements must turn on a comparison of these costs of transacting 
under each” (MASTEN, 1996, p. 44). COASE (1960, p. 43) writes:  
“Economists who study problems of the firm habitually use an oppor-
tunity cost approach and compare the receipts obtained from a given 
combination of factors with alternative business arrangements. It would 
seem desirable to use a similar approach when dealing with questions 
of economic policy and to compare the total product yielded by alter-
native social arrangements.”  
LESCHKE and SAUERLAND (2000) argue that this is a kind of aggregate, institu-
tional benefit-cost-approach to a normative evaluation of institutions, which pre-
serves much association with the received welfare economic analysis.
6 Even so, 
WILLIAMSON (2000, p. 601) has recently insisted that these alternative arrange-
ments must all be feasible to be relevant for policy analysis. We therefore draw 
this approach into the southwest quadrant of Figure 1-1, too, but more closely to 
the east, due to its focus on ‘realistic’ alternatives. 
We finally consider two approaches that more radically departure from the neo-
classical orthodoxy. The first has been labelled ‘constitutional economics’ and 
has emerged from a critique of the normative foundations of welfare economics. 
BUCHANAN (1959) has submitted that economists who give policy advice based 
on an abstract measure of aggregate welfare fail to compare realistic alternatives 
but, by aggregating the welfare of different individuals, also do not take into 
account that each individual should have the right to agree to what is desirable for 
society at large. By retaining a strict methodological individualism based on the 
rational choice model, representatives of this approach have developed “a research 
program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules, and institutions 
within which individuals interact, and the processes through which these rules 
                                           
6 Additional  problems  of  such ‘total product’ comparison are discussed in SCHNEIDER (1987) 
and MILGROM and ROBERTS (1990). There may be circumstances in which high transaction 
costs are in the interest of society at large, for example to prevent market collusion (LESCHKE 
and SAUERLAND, 2000, p. 195).  Introduction  7 
are chosen or come into being” (BUCHANAN, 1990, p. 1). The behavioural foun-
dations of neoclassical economics are maintained because they are regarded as a 
‘worst case’ scenario of opportunistic behaviour.
7 A contractarian rather than a 
utilitarian approach is employed, whereby the focus is on very general rules and the 
consensus among individuals who are affected by constitutional change. Because 
such consensus may be difficult to reach, it has been argued that the approach 
privileges the status-quo (BUCHANAN, 2004). Hence, the location is in the southeast 
quadrant of Figure 1-1.
8 
The second of the more heterodox approaches is ‘classical institutionalism’, also 
sometimes called ‘American institutionalism’. In contrast to the neoclassical 
mainstream and also most ‘new’ institutionalist approaches, the idea of stable 
and exogenous individual preferences is rejected. Although apparently not ‘new’, it 
seems that the school may still contribute valuable insights to the current debate 
in institutional economics. HODGSON (2004, p. 85) demonstrates how the classical 
representatives of this school, including Thorstein VEBLEN, John COMMONS, 
Wesley MITCHELL, and Kenneth GALBRAITH, saw institutions shaping the indi-
vidual will and not vice versa. The individual is “constituted” by its social and 
institutional environment and is no longer the best judge of his or her own welfare 
(HODGSON, 2004, p. 88). Path dependencies, learning, or ‘habituation’ play a major 
role in explaining human behaviour (HODGSON, 1998). For this reason, the ap-
proach is labelled ‘evolutionary’ in Figure 1-1.
9  
With regard to normative evaluation, classical institutionalists tend to be generally 
cautious. AVIO (1999) shows that at best a procedural ethics is offered in which 
participants of communication processes ‘work things out’ (pp. 526-527): 
“Problems are thrown to the surface in an unpredictable fashion; it is then 
up to the participants to resolve these problems within the parameters 
set by appropriately designed social institutions. All solutions are con-
sidered to be provisional, susceptible to the force of new and better 
                                           
7  It should be noted that the rational choice model is chosen here for methodological reasons, 
not to present a ‘realistic’ model of man. Its aim is to intellectually enlighten the citizens of 
a society by generating arguments that are consistent with methodological individualism and 
inform them about potentially superior institutional changes (PIES, 1996). 
8  For a more detailed discussion of constitutional economics see Chapter 3 of this monograph. 
Starting with BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962), another branch of this research programme 
has developed into the literature of ‘public choice’. Following FURUBOTN and RICHTER (2005), 
we do not include this field into our survey of institutional economics. 
9  We hereby follow the conventional terminology in mainstream economics, which regards 
‘evolutionary’ as an antonym to ‘comparative static’ or ‘deterministic’. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that this type of evolutionary economics does not necessarily endorse a Darwinian 
natural selection. For a discussion of the latter-type approaches see VROMEN (2004). Alter-
natively, one could call the evolutionary pole one of structural or institutional determinism 
(HODGSON, 2004, p. 86), as opposed to individual determinism.  8 Introduction 
arguments. Legal-political institutions and the economy evolve in the 
process, and not necessarily toward a static general equilibrium state.” 
It is here where influences of American philosophic pragmatism become evident 
(HANDS, 2001, pp. 213-260).
10 On the normative axis of our stylized map, classical 
institutionalism takes a middle position: on the one hand, there is a clear distance to 
any ‘objective’ benchmark or ideal for evaluating what ought to be. On the other 
hand, an environment where ‘good reasons’ can be brought to bear does not emerge 
without preconditions and does not necessarily prevail in the status-quo. It requires 
certain standards such as transparency, equal rights to communicate, and absence 
of violence, which after all may only be achieved in ideal circumstances.
11 How-
ever, it is a central aim of classical institutionalism to identify the sources and 
applications of power, or “whose interests are to count” (AVIO, 1999, p. 516; see 
also BROMLEY, 1989). For this reason, the separability of distributional and effi-
ciency concerns is denied,
12 and the distinction between positive and normative 
issues is blurred. 
1.2  Institutional economics of European agriculture 
Since the early 1980s, as was noted above, the dissatisfaction with the orthodox 
(neoclassical) approach to agricultural change and policy has stimulated a search 
among agricultural economists in Europe for theories of agriculture-specific in-
stitutional arrangements and decision-making processes in agricultural policy. 
HAGEDORN (1996) provides a comprehensive review of this literature. More 
recently, the range of applications has broadened further, with a focus on topics 
such as the organisation of upstream- and downstream industries in agriculture, 
agricultural transition, environmental and public goods effects of food produc-
tion and their political implications, and bottom-up rural development processes 
(VAN HUYLENBROECK et al., 2004). This broadening of scope notwithstanding, 
there are continuing efforts to provide a generic theory of agricultural organisa-
tion (ALLEN and LUECK, 2002) and there is now an established body of literature 
                                           
10  BROMLEY (2006) has recently elaborated an institutional theory that is explicitly based on this 
foundation. 
11  This has been pointed out by HABERMAS (1983; 1984, pp. 174-183), whose discourse ethics 
also draws on American pragmatism. AVIO (1997; 2002) has identified various parallels 
between the normative aims of constitutional economics, discourse ethics, and classical in-
stitutionalism and has suggested the necessity of a more elaborated dialogue between these 
theoretical camps. VANBERG and BUCHANAN (1989) as well as DENZAU and NORTH (1994) 
provide starting points for such dialogue. It should be added, and this is a limit of the presenta-
tion in Figure 1-1, that pragmatists use a procedural ideal, whereas welfare economists use 
a substantial ideal for normative evaluation. 
12  Starting from a critique of efficiency-based explanations of institutional change, KNIGHT 
(1992) has developed a theory of institutions based on distributional conflict that has some 
resemblance to this view.  Introduction  9 
on the political economy of agricultural policy (see the survey by DE GORTER 
and SWINNEN, 2002). 
Within the limits of this introductory chapter, we cannot provide a comprehen-
sive overview of the literature. Building on the theoretical map put forward in the 
previous section, we will rather attempt to illustrate the diversity of approaches 
and applications by comparing typical examples of institutional analysis in the 
recent agricultural economics literature. We do this by briefly presenting a single 
research article from each of the institutional camps on our map, which allows 
us to highlight the characteristics of each approach. The selection of articles is to 
some extent arbitrary and serves primarily a comparative purpose, which will be 
used, in the final step of this chapter, to identify a number of open questions in 
current institutional economics research on European agricultural development. 
Before we discuss these articles, we should note that the neoclassical mainstream 
is still considered the backbone of agricultural economics by many professionals. 
There are widely used textbooks on agricultural economics that explicitly endorse 
a neoclassical approach to the analysis of structural change and policy in the 
agricultural sector, such as HENRICHSMEYER and WITZKE (1991; 1994) or JUST et al. 
(2004). In the final chapter of the Handbook of Agricultural Economics Vol. 2B, 
GARDNER and JOHNSON (2002, p. 2226) write:  
“The standard conceptual framework for normative analysis of policies 
is welfare economics, with the central issue being the Pareto optimality 
of unregulated market prices as the coordination signal for production 
and consumption decisions.”  
We will not investigate contributions using this framework in more detail, but wish 
to point out its continuing influence. 
The illustrative articles are listed in Table 1-1. For each of the remaining four 
major theoretical approaches, we attempted to find a typical representative in the 
European agricultural economics literature. At the same time, these articles 
cover some of the major areas of institutional economics research on European 
agriculture. 
OZANNE et al. (2001) use a contract-theoretical model to analyse the effects of 
asymmetric information and risk aversion on the compliance of farmers partici-
pating in voluntary agri-environmental schemes. With the recent policy shift to-
ward ‘rural development’, this instrument has gained importance throughout the 
EU’s member countries. 10 Introduction 
Table 1-1:  Examples of institutional economics research on European  
agriculture 
Theoretical approach  Illustrative example 
Formal contract theory  OZANNE, Adam; HOGAN, Tim; COLMAN, David (2001): Moral 
hazard, risk aversion and compliance monitoring in agri-envi-
ronmental policy, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 
Vol. 28, pp. 329-347. 
Transaction cost  
economics 
BOGER, Silke (2001): Quality and contractual choice: A transac-
tion cost approach to the Polish hog market, European Review of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, pp. 241-261. 
Constitutional  
economics 
BREUSS, Fritz; ELLER, Markus (2004): The Optimal Decentrali-
sation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations 
for the European Constitution, Constitutional Political Economy, 
Vol. 15, pp. 27-76. 
Classical  
institutionalism 
BROMLEY, Daniel W.; HODGE, Ian (1990): Private property 
rights and presumptive policy entitlements: Reconsidering the 
premises of rural policy, European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 197-214. 
Source: Author’s  compilation. 
The authors present the problem as a typical principal-agent relationship: be-
cause the environmental authority (the principal) does not know whether the 
farmer (the representative agent) who is paid to provide environmental public 
goods actually does so after the contract is concluded, a moral hazard problem 
arises. Therefore, a fixed fine is levied on fraud, and a positive probability of de-
tection is assumed. Furthermore, the farmer is assumed to be averse to the risk of 
being caught cheating, but otherwise is modelled as a standard expected utility 
maximiser. The authority monitors compliance, whereby monitoring costs may 
vary with effort. In order to represent the ‘public interest’, the (utilitarian) envi-
ronmental authority is assumed to maximise a social welfare function. In a bench-
mark case without moral hazard, compliance monitoring, and risk aversion, the 
welfare function sums the value of abatement depending on restricted input use by 
the farmer, the farmers’ surplus due to compensatory payments, and the (ab-
stract) social marginal costs of public funds, subject to an individual participa-
tion constraint (OZANNE et al., 2001, p. 333). Solving this problem yields a 
‘first-best solution’, in which the marginal social benefit of the scheme equals 
the marginal social cost of abatement. The authors then show how the introduction 
of moral hazard, compliance monitoring, and risk aversion modify the welfare 
function and lead to lower optimal input abatement and compensation payments. 
Therefore only a ‘second-best solution’ can be attained. By comparing these more 
restrictive scenarios with the first-best, and by making assumptions about the 
parameter values of the model, the aggregate social net benefit in euro per ha and  Introduction  11 
hence the ‘informational inefficiency’ (p. 336) is quantified by means of numerical 
simulations. The authors conclude that, to the extent that their assumptions were 
appropriate, real-world compliance monitoring will never be able to deliver a first-
best outcome.
13 
In this article, we find all the constituting elements of formal contract theory men-
tioned above. In behavioural terms, the assumptions of the neoclassical orthodoxy 
are maintained throughout, perhaps extended by risk aversion of the agent. How-
ever, a specific form of ex-post contractual hazard due to asymmetric information 
and the institutional arrangements to avert it are modelled, by using established 
methods of formal microeconomics. In normative terms, the received concept of a 
social welfare function is employed, which serves to provide a ‘first-best’ standard 
to judge other, ‘second-best’ scenarios arising from the specific assumptions of 
the contractual relationship. Society’s ‘welfare’ is condensed into a single, com-
putable number. 
Next, BOGER (2001) is taken as an example for a transaction cost analysis of 
downstream arrangements in the agricultural sector. The author aims to explain why 
Polish hog farmers choose different arrangements from a set of specified marketing 
channels and contractual schemes, given an imperfect quality grading system. 
The available channels include the three options of local slaughterhouse, large 
processor, and trader, whereas the contractual forms of spot market, formal written 
contract, and oral contract are distinguished. These ‘governance structures’ are then 
analysed in the framework of a contracting scheme due to WILLIAMSON (1998), 
and are explained by asset specificity, uncertainty and the availability of safeguar-
ding mechanisms.
14 Based on survey data from Polish hog producers, BOGER 
uses multinomial logit and cluster analyses to identify the determinants of channel 
choice and the interrelations between various contractual variables, among them 
asset-specific investment, contractual forms as listed before, quality, and price. She 
argues that farmers and processors alike have little incentive to invest in high-
quality hog production if there are no market safeguards that reward this effort. 
Her results show that private governance schemes in Poland partly fail to take 
market uncertainty into account. She concludes that public regulation, for example 
in the form of a standardised grading system, or even state ownership of enterprises 
may therefore be required to reduce the transaction costs in Polish hog markets 
(BOGER, 2001, pp. 259-260). 
                                           
13  The authors do consider a case of extremely high risk aversion, or a sufficiently high disutility 
from being caught shirking, in which the moral hazard problem disappears. Under these cir-
cumstances, the limited fine achieves the desired deterrence, and the second-best solution 
converges to the first-best. 
14  ‘Governance structures’ seem to be the more or less synonymous Williamsonian counter-
part to ‘institutional arrangements’. 12 Introduction 
The study is typical for a transaction cost economics approach in its analysis of 
discrete institutional alternatives (i.e., marketing channels) and its focus on a 
particular set of explanatory variables. This is a clear step beyond the frictionless 
world of perfectly predictable and costlessly enforceable contracts and sheds 
light on several important aspects of downstream arrangements under uncertainty. 
Compared to formal contract theory, the characteristics of the transacted com-
modity are analysed in great detail, and the sequencing of contracting steps are 
explicitly taken into account. BOGER (2001, pp. 258, 259) follows the main idea 
of this literature in suggesting that desirable institutional arrangements are those 
which minimise transaction costs. However, transaction costs are not made opera-
tional or explicitly measured, the term rather seems to be a metaphor for the  
contractual hazards that are dealt with in this approach.
15 Whereas the earlier 
transaction cost literature has been criticised for a lack of empirical rigor (SIMON, 
1991, p. 27), the study by BOGER (2001) employs an econometric methodology 
based on specifically collected survey data. Although the assumed cause-effect 
relationship in her logit model is not entirely convincing, because some of the 
explanatory variables may well be the result rather than the determinant of the 
chosen marketing channel, this is a clear step towards a quantitative analysis of 
institutional arrangements. 
BREUSS and ELLER (2004) represent the constitutional economists in our selec-
tion of articles. Against the background of the ongoing debate concerning the 
establishment of a European Constitution, they raise a typical question of constitu-
tional design: how can the competencies between the EU and the Member States 
be delimited in a way that is in the best interest of its citizens? The authors attempt 
to answer this question by providing an overview of arguments from the literature 
on fiscal federalism, which commonly uses mainstream behavioural assumptions 
and normative concepts. They thus decide (without much reflection) to concentrate 
on allocative efficiency as a normative criterion for evaluating the desirability of 
alternative designs. The authors then present the various theoretical advantages 
and disadvantages of fiscal decentralisation, based primarily on the trade-off  
between the consideration of local preferences and the realisation of scale effects 
(p. 30). Furthermore, they survey the empirical literature on the topic, which, ac-
cording to BREUSS and ELLER (2004), fails to identify an unambiguous and auto-
matic relationship between decentralisation and growth (p. 52). Because recom-
mendations therefore have to be case-specific, the authors move on to examine 
various policy areas of the EU, among them the CAP. Based on studies by 
ALESINA et al. (2001) and HOELLER et al. (1996), the authors identify agricultural 
policy as an area with strong discrepancies between actual EU competencies and 
                                           
15  See the discussion of this point in PETRICK (2004, pp. 45-6). MÉNARD and VALCESCHINI 
(2005) stress the relevance of the transaction cost minimisation logic for the choice of gover-
nance structures in the agri-food industry, but suggest that a satisfying answer to the problem 
of measuring these costs is still lacking (p. 426).   Introduction  13 
normative recommendations, where hence a stronger decentralisation is recom-
mended. The two main arguments are that agriculture does not provide public goods 
in the classical sense (at least not necessarily on a European level, we presume), 
and that specific sectoral policies are incompatible with a single internal market 
(p. 55). With regard to the Constitutional Treaty, the authors conclude that the 
current allocation of policy functions to the different administrative levels is, in 
their view, less important than the procedural provisions of the treaty that will de-
termine how future competencies will be allocated. 
It comes immediately to mind that this is a less common topic for agricultural 
economists, and agricultural policy issues are only dealt with in passing by these 
authors. Indeed, due to the sectoral focus, it is difficult to find genuine constitu-
tional economics applications in the agricultural economics literature.
16 On the 
other hand, the process of constitutional design on the European level is an ob-
viously relevant field for this theoretical approach, and at the same time has much 
to do with the current shape of agricultural policies in Europe. Compared to the 
elaborated position of other constitutional economists (as quoted in the previous 
section), BREUSS and ELLER (2004) treat the normative foundation of their   
recommendations rather lightly. The fact that there has been a well-defined, po-
litical process behind the formation of the European constitution (fixed in the 
Laeken Declaration of the European Council) may be an excuse for this. However, 
two characteristics of the constitutional economics approach become apparent in 
this article. The first is to acknowledge that the economist is but one advisor in 
a (potentially multidisciplinary) group of scientist speaking to a constitutional 
convention, which may or may not agree to his/her proposals. BREUSS and 
ELLER (2004, p. 28) explicitly support this view, which is also endorsed by other 
constitutional economists such as BUCHANAN (2004, p. 139). One may argue that 
BREUSS and ELLER come closer to this ideal than most constitutional economists 
before them, due to the exceptional occasion of the European constitutional debate. 
The second characteristic is the insight formulated by the authors that the evidence 
on desirable constitutional rules is inconclusive, that constitutional design is a 
highly complex process, and that it is therefore very cumbersome and long-lasting 
to reach a consensus beyond the status-quo. 
Finally, BROMLEY and HODGE (1990) offer a provocative and, in view of the more 
recent debate on cross compliance and good agricultural practices, farsighted 
reconsideration of property rights in agricultural land.
17 This reconsideration is 
claimed necessary in order to cope with changing preferences for the goods and 
services provided by farmers in the Western world. Starting from the observation 
                                           
16  RUDLOFF (2002) provides an application of environmental federalism to the design of agri-
environmental policy in Europe, but does not analyse constitutional matters. 
17  Although a bit dated, we chose this paper due to its clear commitment to classical institu-
tionalism and a lack of more recent alternatives. 14 Introduction 
that private property rights in land are a product of earlier times when greater  
priority was given to food and fibre production, they argue that these historical 
rights have nowadays been translated into “presumptive entitlements in the policy 
arena” (p. 199), namely a favoured treatment by agricultural policy makers. At 
the same time, BROMLEY and HODGE point out, preferences of citizens have 
shifted towards a higher recognition of what the authors call “countryside and 
community attributes (CCA)”, that is a specific rural milieu that exhibits certain 
visible and environmental quality attributes. While a protective public policy 
stimulates the production of food and fibre in abundance, as the authors argue, 
these CCA are indeed becoming scarce. They therefore suggest to adjust property 
rights to altered preferences by shifting them from the farmer to the collective of 
citizens. As BROMLEY and HODGE elaborate in some detail, the desired level of 
CCA under the new property rights regime would be determined by local collec- 
tive action, whereas food and fibre would be a kind of by-product created by  
private farmers. However, these farmers would have to respect the locally adminis-
tered property rights in land and would have to pay the public for digressing from 
the predefined level of CCA. As a result, payments to deviate from the status-
quo would flow in the opposite direction than in a system where farmers are 
compensated for environmentally motivated input abatement. At the same time, 
the environmental externalities of the existing agricultural system would have 
been internalised (BROMLEY and HODGE, 1990, p. 207). 
The article exhibits several characteristics of what we defined as classical insti-
tutionalism in the previous section. Although BROMLEY and HODGE (1990) do not 
discuss the precise nature of the evolutionary forces that shape individual prefe-
rences, they explicitly appeal to the two-way interaction between individual wants 
and institutions (pp. 207; 209; 211):  
“The proposal under discussion is simply a reflection of new tastes and 
preferences, and new scarcities relating to the agricultural sector and 
its use of land and natural resources. … [S]hifting preferences among the 
citizenry have a major influence on changes in the allocation of property 
rights. … Constraints are initially introduced over actions where, be-
cause of shifting values, social costs are regarded as exceeding private 
benefits. Where those actions are regarded as ‘normal’ compensation 
will be paid. Once the constraints become regarded as normal – and 
especially where the level of environmental quality is still regarded as 
suboptimal – the rationale for compensation becomes weaker and may 
no longer be accepted.”  
The public consensus of what is acceptable or ‘normal’ hence carries normative 
weight, whereas the authors are very sceptical with regard to the traditional effi-
ciency criterion: “Economic efficiency will not suggest which is the ‘correct’ 
property rights structure, for the ‘correct’ property regime will depend upon one’s 
assessment of whose interests ought to be protected by the state (BROMLEY, 1989)”.  Introduction  15 
However, BROMLEY and HODGE (1990) are very clear about how the status-quo 
in property rights translates into an asymmetry of power in the political dis-
course (p. 199):  
“When the agricultural sector … resists efforts to alter the prevailing 
property rights position then a struggle occurs between the presumed 
‘right’ of a landowner to do as he/she wishes, and the ‘right’ of other 
members of society to be free from the unwanted effects of agricul-
tural land use. … [G]iven the apparent sanctity of property rights in land, 
any negotiations with the agricultural sector will start from a position of 
political weakness.” 
It is interesting to note the similarities and differences between the constitutional 
economics and classical institutionalism positions concerning the status-quo. 
Whereas constitutional economists indeed concede each individual a right to 
veto any proposal for rule change, classical institutionalists are concerned about 
the possibly unjust authority the status-quo gains by this veto right. Although they 
agree with constitutional economists in rejecting any normative standard that is 
detached from individual assent, they apparently perceive it as legitimate to pro-
pose institutional changes which produce losers. While representatives of both 
theoretical camps stress the need to generate arguments for a discourse of in-
formed citizens who are the final decision-making body, only constitutional 
economists believe that such arguments can be derived from a rational choice 
analysis. 
1.3  Theoretical and methodological challenges and overview of the  
monograph 
We are now in a position to identify a number of current challenges in institutional 
economics research on European agriculture. In view of the remaining chapters of 
this monograph, we focus on three aspects: 
1.  A first area of controversy is located on the vertical or positive axis of Figure 1-1. 
It concerns the question to what extent individual preferences are exogenous 
to the institutional environment or whether they are influenced and shaped by 
it. We have seen how classical institutionalists endorse the latter view, while 
the mainstream approach in economics is to regard preferences as stable and 
to presume that individuals are the best judges of what is good for them.  
2.  A second area of debate concerns the horizontal or normative axis of Figure 1-1. 
Among the approaches outlined previously, constitutional economists and 
classical institutionalists have formulated particularly pronounced critiques 
of orthodox welfare economics. But if the ‘utopian’ standard of the traditional 
model is regarded as unsatisfying, the question arises what concept or standard 
can take its place? 16 Introduction 
3.  A third area explores the potential for econometric applications in institutional 
economics. Among the four articles from recent literature presented in the pre-
vious section, only one contained a quantitative analysis based on real-world 
data, although the latter is traditionally considered a hallmark of agricultural 
economics research (HERRMANN, 2005). According to WILLIAMSON (2000, 
p. 607), “more and better empirical work” in institutional economics is needed. 
However, many institutional economists appear to shy away from econometric 
analysis, partly because it puts specific demands on data and the operationali-
sation of concepts. 
Each of these areas describes the starting point of one of the subsequent chapters 
in the monograph, in which constructive proposals to address these challenges 
are offered. In general, we do not seek a radical break with the mainstream, but 
aim at a ‘friendly amendment’ of standard approaches, thus trying to make insti-
tutional economic arguments fruitful for a microeconomic analysis of agricul-
tural policy issues.  
In Chapter 2, we address the issue of endogeneous preferences and how they 
may be malleable as a consequence of power asymmetries among agents, which in 
turn emerge from a historically determined institutional environment. We present a 
model of collective farm restructuring in the successor countries of the Former 
Soviet Union. In this model managers, due to their entitlements inherited from the 
previous political system, have some latitude to influence the will of farm workers 
who are facing the choice of staying in the collective or establishing a private farm 
on their own. The model is put forward as a proposal to enrich standard microeco-
nomic models by institutional feedback mechanisms and power asymmetries 
among agents, taking into account insights from other social science disciplines.  
In Chapter 3, we explore the potential for an alternative normative framework 
enabling the evaluation of institutional arrangements. We offer some thoughts on 
how the constitutional economics approach could be made productive for a norma-
tive analysis of sub-constitutional arrangements. The chapter develops a social 
dilemma heuristic that is compatible with much of the current positive institutional 
economics literature, but seeks to be explicit about its normative foundations. At the 
same time, its ability to generate arguments for a political discourse is discussed. 
An illustrative example from rural credit policy complements the otherwise more 
conceptual presentation.  
Chapter 4 turns to questions of quantitative analysis. It attempts to show how the 
concept of hedonic pricing, which is well-established in other areas of economic 
research, could be used to motivate an empirical investigation of credit arrange-
ments and the effects of structural policies in the agricultural sector. Based on 
unique survey data from agricultural credit contracts in Poland, the monetary value 
of single contractual attributes, including that of participation in a government 
programme, is quantified. This technique could also be extended to other areas 
where differentiated contracts are important.  Introduction  17 
The three areas of institutional economics research and their place in the mono-
graph are summarised in Figure 1-2. 
Figure 1-2:  Selected theoretical and methodological challenges of  
institutional economics research and where they are  
addressed in the monograph 
Institutional  
economics of  
European agriculture
Positive theory formation: 
How can the influence of 
institutional arrangements 
on preferences be modelled?
(chapter 2) 
Normative theory formation: 
How can a normative 
institutional economics 
usefully be structured? 
(chapter 3) 
Quantitative analysis: 
How can institutional economics 




Source: Author’s  presentation. 
As a final proviso it should be noted that it is not the aim of this monograph to 
develop the correct and comprehensive institutional approach to the agricultural 
sector in Europe that is likewise theoretically and empirically tractable. Such an 
ambition would be unlikely to succeed and is, at the same time, incompatible 
with a pluralistic epistemology in economics (HANDS, 2001; PETRICK, 2004a). 
What we wish to provide is a structuring of ideas and concepts along the three 
topics given in Figure 1-2, with motivation taken from and applications deve-
loped for current problems in European agriculture. 
 
  
2  Positive theory formation:  
Endogenous preferences, power asymmetries, and the  
persistence of collective farms in post-Soviet agriculture 
After one and a half decades of agricultural transition in the former Soviet Union, 
economists continue to be puzzled by the lack of change in farming organisation 
in all but a few successor countries. The persistence of large farms is particularly 
outstanding in Ukraine and Russia. Although entrusted with formal property 
rights in land and assets, agricultural workers as the new owners seem to be quite 
hesitant to establish smaller family farms. Due to their prevalence in most market 
economies, these have commonly been regarded as a blueprint for farm restructu-
ring (KOESTER, 2005). However, as LERMAN et al. (2004, p. 123) note in a recent 
monograph on the state of agricultural transition in this region,  
“The overwhelming majority of farm workers in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Moldova prefer to keep their land and asset shares in the former col-
lective, which in the meantime has reregistred as a corporate farm with 
a new market-sounding name. They waive their right of exit, at least for 
the time being, and pool their resources to create a corporate structure.” 
A common explanation for this absence of change has been that exit costs for 
individual workers are too high, because they lack the physical and human re-
sources to take the risk of running a business on their own, and because up- and 
downstream markets are still largely geared to large collective successor farms 
(See MATHIJS and SWINNEN, 1998 and RIZOV, 2003 for expositions of these argu-
ments).  
There is no doubt that lacking resources and pervasive market imperfections are 
major reform obstacles. However, this explanation remains unsatisfying or at least 
incomplete because it is unable to deal with a number of observations that have 
been made in the course of transition.  
First, why is it that not only the managers of large farms, but also the group of 
agricultural workers apparently stand united to oppose the establishment of smaller 
private farms in those countries where reform is stagnating? KOESTER (2005, p. 109) 
summarises the attitude of managers as follows: 
“Managers were used to feeling socially responsible for the employees 
on the farm. … [They] believe in a specific role of the state, namely to 
accept social responsibility for the survival of the large farms.” 20  Positive theory formation 
With regard to farm workers, LERMAN et al. (2004, p. 158) report that: 
“Only 6-7% of respondents in household surveys in Russia and Ukraine 
indicate that they would like to exit the farm enterprise with their share 
of land and assets and establish a private farm. Nearly half the respon-
dents in Ukraine (47%) are even opposed in principle to the right of exit 
with land and asset shares, although this right is protected by existing 
laws.” 
Second, why is it that local up- and downstream markets do not develop to better 
serve the needs of small farmers? If family farms are a superior mode of organi-
sation, economic incentives exist to overcome prevailing market imperfections. 
An explanation is hence required why individual entrepreneurs do not emerge to 
set up a more favourable business environment for private farmers, as it does exist 
in most Western economies. 
Third, why do we observe such a striking duality in reform patterns across the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)? Whereas large farm structures re-
mained more or less untouched in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and the Central Asian 
republics, there has been a complete dismantling of collectives and a far-reaching 
individualization of agriculture in the Baltics and the Trans-Caucasian countries 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (SWINNEN and ROZELLE, 2006). It seems that 
resource endowments and market failures are matters of degree, so that more 
evenly distributed reform outcomes across countries and regions would have been 
expected. 
This chapter offers an alternative explanation for the persistence of pre-reform 
farming structures in the CIS countries that is consistent with these observations. 
It is based on the argument that corporate farm managers exploit the tendency of 
workers for conformity within the collective to cement their own power. Building 
on commonplace observation and theories of social psychology, we argue that farm 
workers have preferences for behaving in conformity with peers. We then assume 
that farm managers benefit from the pre-reform status quo, because it assures 
them access to income, local power and prestige. These managers may find it 
expedient to manipulate their workers in a way that they reject any organisational 
change as being not conform with the norm. It is suggested that workers either  
receive monetary benefits in exchange for behaving loyally to the manager, or 
managers may actively keep the horizon of farm workers limited. They do this 
by withholding information concerning privatisation rights, preventing political 
organisation, not allowing outsiders to invade the village or start businesses with 
defecting workers, and by stressing the necessity of ‘collective solutions’ to 
problems. 
By modifying a framework due to SCHAFFNER (1995), these arguments are for-
malised and their theoretical implications derived. It is shown that farm managers 
have an incentive to employ workers that are loyal to them and to alienate outsiders   Positive theory formation  21 
who might undermine this loyalty, and that they may be willing to sacrifice farm 
profits for benefits that arise from keeping the pre-reform structures. Workers in 
turn may find the status-quo organisation of agriculture just ‘normal’ and thereby 
perpetuate its existence, although a higher paying reform alternative exists. Whether 
farm managers pay workers higher wages to keep them loyal or whether they 
sequester them depends on the relative costs of both options, and a mixture of both 
strategies may prevail in a given region. A regional equilibrium is derived in 
which either all corporate farms in a given area remain intact or all farms are dis-
solved. These implications are shown to be largely consistent with the evidence. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the following section 2.1, we motivate our 
approach by summarising recent evidence on social interaction effects and authority 
structures in post-Soviet rural areas. Section 2.2 presents the formal model. Sec-
tions 2.3 and 2.4 derive its implications with regard to loyalty elicitation strategies 
and the formation of regional reform equilibria. In section 2.5, the model results 
are confronted with further empirical evidence. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.1  Group conformity and patronage in the post-Soviet countryside 
Introspection and casual empirics confirm that a human tendency for conformity is 
ubiquitous in everyday life. It has its theoretical foundations in the social psycho-
logy literature and can be defined as the dependence of individual preferences on the 
behaviour of a social reference group. According to ARONSON (1992, pp. 13-33), 
conformity is reinforced if the majority of the group has an unanimous opinion, 
if the other group members are important and comparable to the individual, or if 
the individual fears social punishment by peers. SCHAFFNER (1995, p. 249) hence 
argues that it is particularly strong in rural communities where the individuals’ 
work, kinship, social and religious groups are almost coincident. In addition, people 
have a tendency for conformity if the environment of the individual becomes in-
creasingly uncertain, so that the behaviour of others provides guidance on what 
is the right thing to do (ARONSON, 1992, p. 28). In the transitional context of farm 
restructuring in the CIS, this is likely to be a relevant factor. 
It is therefore not surprising that a number of studies have found evidence in favour 
of deeply rooted preferences for group conformity in rural areas of the former 
Soviet Union. The strong social consensus on the rules of the Russian village is 
described by PAXSON (2002), who mentions the moral obligation to work together 
and to help each other in the village community; a generally strong emphasis of 
reciprocity; and the resentment to carry out cash transactions with a socially close 
individual. She also reports that the subordination of one’s own will to that of the 
group is a virtue explicitly endorsed by villagers. 
Of particular importance for the moral economy of the Russian village seems a 
socially sanctioned, egalitarian wealth distribution (PAXSON, 2002). HAIMSON (1988) 
stresses how homogenous and self-contained peasant communities were at the 
eve of collectivisation in the early twentieth century. This led to a strong refusal 22  Positive theory formation 
of the idea that land is treated as a commodity that could be sold to outsiders of 
the community. SCHULZE (2002) cites a number of recent polls which consistently 
show that the rural population rejects buying and selling of land. Acquiring land 
for personal benefit is seen as ‘conflicting with the norm’ (p. 314). SCHULZE argues 
that this attitude goes back to the traditional land commune obshchina,
18 and that 
it was probably reinforced by the comparatively long period of collectivised agri-
culture in the Soviet Union. SCHMEMANN (1997, p. 314) writes, based on expe-
riences in a central Russian village:  
“The communal mentality of the prerevolutionary countryside was 
only strengthened by collectivization, and those peasants who stayed 
on the land stayed there precisely for the sense of collective security 
offered. To grab a large piece of land for oneself and to milk it for 
money was to spit in the face of the collective and to lose its protection.” 
These insights suggest that it may be a shortcoming to neglect the importance of 
group-based social norms and their influence on individual decision-making in 
the post-Soviet countryside. 
The hierarchical authority structures in post-Soviet rural areas are another fact 
frequently mentioned in the literature.
19 In discussing the reasons for the lacking 
restructuring of collective farms, LERMAN et al. (2004, p. 149) argue that: 
“[A] factor that must not be ignored is the traditional power of the 
manager, both as an omniscient community leader who decides every-
thing in the village and as a representative of the outside authorities 
(regional or federal). In many instances, the manager exercises influence 
to prevent deep restructuring and preserve the large-scale organization 
as a way to keep his power and his perquisites. Personal survival is a 
behavioral factor that influences and motivates the decisions of managers 
in all corporations, and farm managers in transition economies are not an 
exception.” 
In an in-depth study of two rural regions in Ukraine and Russia, ALLINA-PISANO 
(2002) finds that these tendencies have been reinforced during the transition  
period (pp. 310-11):  
                                           
18  The obshchina or mir was a communal organization based on joint ownership of land that 
emerged from ancient tribal communities in rural Russia. As a special legal relationship 
between landlords, state and labourers, it had the power of local jurisdiction and periodical 
land redistribution, according to family size. Members were collectively responsible for taxes 
levied against the obshchina. The system was practised until the beginning of the Russian civil 
war (see PAXSON, 2002; SCHULZE, 2002 for overviews). 
19  An early articulation of the idea that emerging private farmers threat the local power of estab-
lished farm chairpersons who therefore might steer the reform process according to their 
own interest is VAN ATTA (1993). More recently, VALENTINOV and NEDOBORVSKY (2005) 
have reaffirmed this point for Ukraine.   Positive theory formation  23 
“Declines in production meant that many of the lines of interdependence 
that support household and enterprise economies became lines of mere 
dependence. The flexible quid pro quo … came to resemble a precarious 
entitlement system that requires workers to be on good terms with 
managers as much as possible at all times. With his control of inputs for 
household production, his connections with district administration, his 
ability to conduct informal large-scale transactions for fuel, sugar, and 
other commodities on behalf of the enterprise, the chairman of a farm 
literally holds the fate of its workers in his hands. As every villager 
learns, … ‘it’s better to keep silent or ‘say yes sir’”. 
She concludes (p. 314):  
“Farm managers and district administrators – as gatekeepers to the exer-
cise of enterprise members’ ownership rights – gained de facto owner-
ship of land and with it, the autonomy and economic incentive to persist 
in their new roles as leaders in a quasi-feudal system.” 
In ALLINA-PISANO (2004, pp. 501-7), the author describes how chairmen of col-
lective farm successors and other local authorities were intimidating those who left 
to set up their own private farm. Apparently common harassment practices in-
cluded attempts to turn public opinion against private farming by launching critical 
articles in the local press, publicly belie it as something strange, suspicious and 
worthy of ridicule, up to acts of open violence against family members of private 
farmers. 
Furthermore, it is shown how authorities used the notion of the stranger and out-
sider as an instrument to drive a wedge between the (loyal) rural population and 
private farmers. The fact that many of these independent farmers emerged from 
marginal groups of the rural society, such as single women or members of ethnic 
minorities, was publicly denounced, and representatives were insulted and called 
‘Gypsies’. 
There are hence various ways in which social and political pressure is exerted to 
force villagers into a behaviour that is supportive of the goals of local authorities. 
Dependence on the latter “cowers people into what is quite rational political pas-
sivity in the circumstances”, as HUMPHREY (2002, p. 155) notes. 
Building on these observations of local power structures, we examine their inter-
action with the commonly observed tendency among villagers to behave in con-
formity with their peers, which makes it particularly easy for the farm chairperson 
or manager to manipulate his or her workers.  24  Positive theory formation 
2.2  A model of manager-induced organizational stability in post-Soviet  
agriculture 
Our model formalises the idea that corporate farm managers exploit the tendency 
of workers for conformity within the collective to cement their own position and 
power. It has been inspired by an approach due to SCHAFFNER (1995), who analy-
ses the stability of servility arrangements in feudal, pre-capitalist agriculture. 
SCHAFFNER argues that if workers prefer to do what their peer workers do, farmers 
of large estates may have an incentive to limit the day-to-day contact between 
their own labour force and non-servile workers in order to create a servility culture 
on the farm. She thus introduced the notion of ‘keeping the horizons limited’ as a 
strategy to secure power relations within an administrative hierarchy. We adopt this 
idea and apply it to post-Soviet agriculture which, according to several authors 
mentioned in the previous section, displays a number of parallels to feudal agricul-
tural systems. In contrast to SCHAFFNER, and more in line with reality, we focus 
on a one-tier labour market and do not model alternative wage contracts. Instead, 
we introduce the possibility that farm workers may leave the collective and set up 
their own individual farm. In addition, to keep the model simple, we abstract from 
enforcement problems related to labour effort on the collective farm.
20 
2.2.1  Individual vs. social utility 
Despite its intuitive plausibility, economists have only recently paid increasing 
attention to the formal modelling of social interaction effects (see BROCK and 
DURLAUF, 2001 for an overview). A standard approach has been to split the utility 
function into an individual and an additively separable social component. Further-
more, it is commonly assumed that deviations far from group average are penalised 
more strongly (JONES, 1984). Given a choice variable,  0 ≥ λ , the resulting com-
posite utility function, 
* u , may then be represented as follows: 
() ( )
2 * ) ( ) ( λ λ λ − − = v g u u , (2-1) 
with individual utility  (.) u , social utility  ( )
2 ) ( λ λ − v . (.) g  transforms λ into a 
utility-relevant magnitude, for example income, and λ  is average behaviour in 
the social reference group. Moreover,  0 ' , ' > v u .  
As will be discussed in detail below, (2-1) formalises the idea that individuals 
have preferences for conformity with their peers, or doing what is the normal 
thing to do in a given social reference group. Both increasing positive or nega-
tive deviations from group average cause increasing discomfort, but there is no 
discomfort if everybody in the group behaves identically and chooses the same λ. 
As a result, outcomes will likely be homogenous within a social reference group, 
but may be radically different between groups.  
                                           
20  The author is grateful to Michael R. CARTER for valuable advice on the formal modelling 
part of this chapter.   Positive theory formation  25 
JONES (1984) and SCHAFFNER (1995) introduce a third utility component into (2-1), 
according to which choice of a higher λ also has an intrinsic disutility. While this 
may be plausible for applications to work effort and servility services, we neglect 
this in the current application to workers’ loyalty. A major reason to model workers 
as indifferent to loyalty as such is that loyalty causes little physical effort and ap-
pears much less personally humiliating than servility as described by SCHAFFNER. 
Under our assumption, however, it is individually less attractive to deviate from 
group norms. 
2.2.2  Social reference groups and the geography of the model 
We distinguish two major reference groups that may influence the behaviour of 
villagers, which we denote narrow and wide. The narrow reference group is the 
community of people living in geographical proximity to the individual. We 
pragmatically identify this with the county or raion, which has been the lower level 
of the two-tiered administrative system throughout the former Soviet Union. In 
most rural regions of Ukraine and Russia, each collective farm forms the economic 
and social centre of a village, and a raion contains a dozen or so collective farms. 
Sociological field work in rural Russia has shown that there has been some mobility 
within localities, for example because villages were abandoned by the government 
and the population forced to relocate to nearby places. However, most rural people 
spend their entire life in a certain area, where they are surrounded by their rela-
tives (O’BRIEN et al., 2000, p. 95). People living in a region are more likely to meet 
in person on a regular basis and hence form a natural social reference group.
21 
Social interaction within this reference group, and information flow in particular, 
is hard to manipulate by local authorities. 
As a second reference group we posit a wider, potentially non-rural population 
that provides an alternative blueprint for what is the right thing to do and how to 
behave. With regard to de-collectivisation in agriculture, the mode of behaviour 
of this social reference group is codified in the national reform legislation, which 
gives an individual worker the right to leave the collective and withdraw his/her 
assets. It is identified with a reform-oriented, urban majority, and with family farms 
in Western Europe or North America, which are presented as a model for agri-
cultural restructuring. In countries with a strong tradition of individualised farming 
prior to collectivisation, the members of former generations may constitute part of 
the reference group. Information about this social reference group is primarily 
transmitted via the media, through television or newspaper, through tradition, but 
also via agents of change who enter a community, in village congregations, or by 
                                           
21  In addition, many regions are homogenous in ethnic terms, some of them officially recognised 
as autonomous areas subject to the ethno-territorial principle of both the former Soviet and the 
current Russian constitutions (STADELBAUER, 1996, pp. 42-49). 26  Positive theory formation 
word of mouth.
22 In contrast to the narrow reference group, interaction with the 
wide reference group can assumedly be influenced by the local farm manager. He 
may or may not keep the horizon of his workers limited by withholding informa-
tion concerning privatisation and other civil rights, preventing political organisation 
of farm workers, not allowing outsiders to invade the village, inhibiting the creation 
of support networks or businesses for private farmers, frightening defectors, and 
stressing collective identity and local ‘collective solutions’ to problems.
23 The 
degree to which the manager keeps horizons limited determines how strongly farm 
workers identify themselves with the wider, reform-minded reference group, as will 
be formalised below.  
2.2.3  Workers’ and managers’ choice 
Farm workers have preferences, u, for income, y, and additive preferences, v, for 
conformity with other workers in their reference group. Their income depends 
on a binary loyalty decision, λ. They may either stay on the local corporate farm, 
1 = λ , in which case they support the farm manager in local politics, e.g. voting 
for him in the farm assembly, and do not exert their right in asset shares of the 
farm. Loyal workers receive an annual wage, w. Labour contracts can be en-
forced costlessly by the corporate farm manager and there is no other employer in 
reach for farm workers than the local corporate farm. Alternatively, workers 
may choose to become independent farmers and withdraw their assets from the 
corporate farm,  0 = λ , in which case they receive an income from private farming, 
) (
nar f λ , with  0 '< f . The marginal product from private farming depends on how 
many other workers in the narrow reference group are reform-minded and hence 
disloyal to the corporate farm manager, with 
nar λ  the share of loyal workers in 
the region. This is thought to be due to various types of network externalities, 
for example the necessary political support for restructuring up- and downstream 
                                           
22  In Russia, this reference group has been represented by the reform-oriented Association of 
Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives of Russia (AKKOR). According to WEGREN 
(1995, pp. 28-29), AKKOR had a network of branches in every oblast by the mid 1990s, 
held annual congresses, and published an own weekly newspaper, ‘The Russian Farmer’. It 
supports private property and freedom of land use. Although its primary constituents are 
private peasant farmers, it appears to have more support in urban than in rural areas. Similar 
movements exist in other CIS countries.  
23  CSAKI and LERMAN (1997, p. 4) describe how farm managers use information control to 
keep horizons limited: “The beneficiaries in the land sharing process appear to be uninformed 
concerning the rights attached to their land shares. Thus, only 8% of respondents with 
shares report that it is allowed to sell land shares. … On the other hand, most respondents 
(80%) know that they are allowed to ‘invest’ their land shares in the farm enterprise, thus 
becoming shareholders of a new corporate entity… The option of investing the shares in 
the farm enterprise is recognized by almost all respondents because it has been repeatedly 
emphasized by farm managers, who are apparently the main source of information about 
land reform and who very conveniently have omitted to mention the other legally available 
options for internal restructuring.” Similar evidence is provided by KOESTER (1999).   Positive theory formation  27 
markets for private farmers, and learning processes and information spill-overs 
among reform oriented entrepreneurs to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity in deci-
sion making.
24 
It is assumed that farm workers make comparisons among each other with regard to 
how loyal they are to the corporate farm management. An individual perceives the 
more discomfort the stronger he/she deviates from average group behaviour in 
terms of loyalty, expressed by the share of loyal workers in the reference group, 
λ . Utility is assumed to decrease with the composite term 
2 ) ( λ λ − . For simplicity 
it is assumed that both utility functions are linear, hence  0 const ' , ' > = v u . 
A farm manager allocates the labour force of his farm, consisting of N workers, 
and assets, A, to produce composite farm revenue, by using a concave technology 
() A N F σ σ , . Corporate farm assets are the sum of all individual asset shares, and 
asset shares can be withdrawn by workers if they wish. Accordingly, the share 









λ σ . The manager is as-
sumed to be the residual claimant of farm profit.
25 A manager therefore benefits 
from the loyalty of farm workers, who support him politically, perpetuate the 
existence of the collective farm and thus secure his income and local power. 
Although not modelled formally here, benefits for the manager may also be of 
a psychological nature.
26 
Being aware of social reference group effects among his/her workers, a manager 
can deliberately keep the horizon of farm workers limited by sheltering them 
from the wider reference group and by exerting explicit or implicit political and 
social pressure on them, as described above. Let  1 = θ  if the manager actively 
keeps the horizon of his loyal workers limited and  0 = θ  otherwise, with 
] 1 .. 0 [ ∈ θ . Limiting the horizon has an influence on which reference group farm 
workers use to assess their utility from behaving loyally to the manager. If 
workers’ horizon is kept limited, they compare their own behaviour with that of 
all other workers in the region, 
nar λ λ = . If the horizon is not kept limited, they 
                                           
24  While there is now an established body of literature on economic network effects in agglome-
ration, only more recently has interest increased in how social interactions foster the emergence 
of entrepreneurs in a given region (see MINNITI, 2005 for an overview). 
25    Little is known about the remuneration of the core management of corporate farms. 
KOESTER (1999, p. 216) reports that many of the farm chairmen appear to enjoy a respectable 
living standard despite the poor economic situation of agriculture. It is hence assumed that they 
are the de facto residual claimants of profits. 
26  Psychological benefits may arise because managers enjoy being the ‘head of a commune’ 
(AMELINA, 2000, p. 503). The manager may also have a preference for seeing agricultural 
production organized in corporate farms. This could be the case if he/she has professional 
concerns that the farm’s dissolution will be economic mischief and lead to a food crisis 
(KOESTER, 2005, p. 109). 28  Positive theory formation 
compare their behaviour with the wider reference group, 
wide λ λ = . The wide 
reference group is assumed to be at least moderately reform-minded on average, 
so that  5 . 0 <
wide λ . As a consequence, workers who accept the wider social refe-
rence group always experience less discomfort from choosing disloyalty than 
from remaining loyal to the manager. It is assumed that 
wide λ  is exogenous and 
can not be influenced by decisions of individual farm workers. By choosing θ , the 
manger determines the relative weight of the two possible reference groups of 
workers: 
wide nar λ θ λ θ λ ) 1 ( − + = . How costly it is to keep horizons limited is given 
by a cost function  ) , ( R C C θ
θ θ = . Costs may arise from own political activity of 
the manager to turn down reform-minded influences from outside the region, or 
bribes to public authorities who might stand up for civil rights of workers. This 
function depends on a vector of regional characteristics, R, that includes the exis-
tence of conservative vs. reform-oriented political networks in a given region, 
strength of collective vs. individual traditions, distance to urban centres, climatic 
and technological dimensions of agricultural production, etc (such differences 
are discussed, e.g., by AMELINA, 2000). It is assumed that  0 1 >
θ C  and  0 11 >
θ C , 
implying that it is marginally costlier to achieve higher levels of sheltering. The 
survival of the corporate farm in a given village depends on the ability of its 
manager to assure loyalty of a sufficient number of workers in that village, subject 
to a budget constraint. 
The optimisation problem for a farm worker is hence: 
( )
2 ) ( ) ( Max λ λ
λ
− − = v y u u
w ,   (2-2) 













y  , and  (2-3) 
wide nar λ θ λ θ λ ) 1 ( − + = . (2-4) 
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j j j j j j j N w R C N A F σ θ σ σ
θ − − = Π ) , ( ) , ( , the corporate farm’s budget constraint, 
and 
) 0 ( ) 1 ( = ≥ = λ λ
w w u u , the loyalty or participation constraint. 
Managers make decisions concerning θ  and w, to which workers react by 
choosing λ, according to the utility they derive from behaving loyally or disloyally 
to the manager. Because the decision of a single worker not only depends on the 
manager’s offer but also on the behaviour of other individuals in his/her social   Positive theory formation  29 
reference group, identical offers by managers may lead to different workers’ re-
sponse in different regions. This is analysed in further detail below. 
To summarise the intuition, workers’ relative remuneration is, in two distinct ways, 
influenced by social interaction effects. First, there is a market effect. The latter 
may be described as a network externality or critical-mass phenomenon that influen-
ces the monetary returns from independent farming. The more workers turn into 
private farmers, the easier it is, both economically and politically, to establish 
independent farming as an accepted organisational mode. Second, there is a psy-
chological effect, according to which non-conformity with the reference group 
causes discomfort. This may usefully be analysed by focusing on the polar cases 
of  1 = λ  (all workers in the reference group are loyal to the manager) and  0 = λ  
(nobody is loyal). In the first case, switching from  0 = λ  to  1 = λ  means making 
one’s own behaviour conform with all the others in the reference group, so that 
the disutility from nonconformity completely vanishes. In the second case, how-
ever, the worker switches into nonconformity, and this may outweigh monetary 
benefits from loyalty. Conversely, if most people in the reference group are loyal 
to the manager, switching into disloyalty causes discomfort but yields the oppor-
tunity to benefit from private farming. In his/her loyalty decision, the worker thus 
weighs the utility from wage payments or higher earnings from private farming 
against the potential disutility from non-conform behaviour. Which reference group 
is used to make this assessment can be influenced by the manager who may opt 
to keep the horizons of his/her workers limited. 
2.3  Least-cost elicitation of loyalty 
To understand the logic of the model, it is useful to interpret it as a cost minimi-
sation problem for the manager who wants to secure the loyalty of his/her workers 
(1 = j σ ). This can be captured as follows: 
) , ( Min
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subject to  
0 ) 0 ( ) 1 ( = = − = λ λ
w w u u ,   (2-6) 
that is the participation constraint is just binding in the optimum. 
After introducing the function P as a shorthand for the participation constraint, 
) 0 ( ) 1 ( = − = = λ λ
w w u u P , the total differential of the cost function yields the 











θ , which in the optimum state is equal to the marginal cost of securing 
loyalty of workers.  30  Positive theory formation 
This describes how θ  and w jointly contribute to ensure workers’ loyalty and 











w = = . (2-7) 
The second term of the latter equation describes an isocost curve of securing 
loyalty. The third term describes an isoeffect curve, that is the locus of all  w , θ  
combinations where the joint effect of θ  and w just suffices to make  ) 1 ( = λ
w u  
as high as  ) 0 ( = λ
w u . Analysing the single components of the optimality condition 
allows us to be more precise with regard to the shape of the isocost and isoeffect 
curves. From the definition of 
m C  in (2-5) follows that  const = = j
m
w N C , that is 
the costs of a marginal wage increase is determined by the number of workers. 
Furthermore, given our earlier assumption about the costs of limiting the horizon, 
0 1 > =
θ
θ C C
m . The more θ  is used, the costlier is the marginal increase. The iso-
cost curve therefore has a concave shape (Figure 2-1). wu is the upper bound of 
w. It denotes the locus at which  f w =  for a given 
nar λ  if  0 = θ , that is loyalty 
elicitation occurs only through wage payments.
27 
Because 
θ C  is also dependent on regional characteristics, R, different regions 
exhibit different isocost curves. The leftward shift shown in Figure 2-1 is in-
duced by relatively increasing costs of limiting the horizon vis-à-vis the wage 
costs.  
It is also possible to determine the shape of the isoeffect curve. To ease the 
analysis, we assume that  0 =
wide λ . After inserting (2-2) to (2-4) into  P, 
nar nar nar v v f u w u v f u v w u P λ θ λ θ λ θ 2 ) ( ) ( ) ) (( ) ( ) ) 1 (( ) (
2 2 + − − = + − − − = .  
It follows that  const '= =
w
w u P , that is the effect of an increased wage is just the 
(assumedly constant) marginal utility of income for the loyal worker. Moreover, 
0 2 ≥ = = const v P
nar λ θ . In words, how effective it is to keep horizons limited in 
a given region depends on how many workers are (still) loyal. The previous result 
also implies that the isoeffect curve, within the [0..1] boundaries, is a straight 
line. Keeping horizons limited is a perfect substitute for increasing wages, as 
long as there are loyal workers in the region and as long horizons are not yet 
fully limited. 
 
                                           
27  In actual practice, a part of the wage may be paid in-kind, including inputs and machinery 
access for the worker’s household plot and other non-monetary benefits, such as discounted 
meals in the corporate farm’s cafeteria or access to health services.   Positive theory formation  31 














Source: Author’s  figure. 
Both the isocost and isoeffect curves may now be drawn into one figure, in which 
the tangency point satisfies the optimality condition (2-7) and thus determines the 
optimal choice of θ  and w for securing loyalty of workers (Figure 2-2), denoted with 
asterisks. This figure also implies that different isocost curves in different regions 
lead to varying optimal elicitation strategies. Regional characteristics determine how 
managers elicit loyalty and how costly it is. In regions where politically influen-
tial managers cannot afford to pay higher wages, they will resort to a strategy of 
keeping horizons limited in order to secure the survival of their corporate farm.  










Source: Author’s  figure. 32  Positive theory formation 
2.4  Regional reform equilibrium with social interaction effects 
In the following, we analyse how interaction between managers and workers and 
among workers drives reform choices in the model and show how polar equilibria 
may be induced, with either all or no farm workers loyal to corporate farm managers. 
We proceed in three steps that are illustrated by the three charts in Figure 2-3. 
First, we investigate the pure market effect of social interaction. After that, the 
psychological effect and the effect of limiting horizons are added. 
Charts (a) to (c) in Figure 2-3 display the utility pay-offs for workers as a function 
of the regional share of loyal workers, 
nar λ . In chart (a) we set  0 '= v , so that the 
two lines show the pure monetary or market effect of each worker’s loyalty deci-
sion. Line w represents the constant wage payment each loyal worker obtains. 
Line f illustrates how positive network externalities from establishing independent 
private farms lead to higher pay-offs if more workers choose disloyalty. The key 
implication of this externality is indicated by the solid arrow: the more workers 
have already chosen disloyalty and established a private farm, the more attractive it 
becomes for the marginal worker to do the same. On the other hand, workers who 
are loyal and receive a wage income are indifferent to what others do. The long-run 
equilibrium will therefore be that all workers coordinate on the disloyalty decision. 
However, coordination on this full de-collectivisation equilibrium may be difficult 
and long-lasting if, in a given region, only few workers have chosen to leave the 
collective farm. As shown in chart (a), a critical mass of reform-minded workers 
is required to reach the upward-sloping part of the solid line, in which case the re-
form equilibrium is self reinforcing. For this reason, even though independent 
farming yields higher pay-offs, external forces, for example an information cam-
paign, may be necessary to reach this equilibrium. How likely it is that private 
farms emerge depends on the location of the flip point, or kink in the pay-off axis. 
The further this is on the left, the higher the probability that collective farms remain 
intact. 
The situation changes if psychological benefits from conformity are allowed for, 
that is  0 '> v  (chart (b)). For the moment, we (unrealistically) assume that there 
is no limiting of horizons at all. Workers therefore adopt the wide social reference 
group, which in our model means that they are influenced by pro-reform groups 
and feel uneasy with behaving loyally. In the chart, this is illustrated by a parallel 
downward shift of the wage line, from w to w’. Every loyal worker lives in dis-
harmony with the reform-minded average and thus experiences a utility loss (that is 
independent of what others in the region do). Workers can evade this discomfort 
by leaving the collective farm. Because the kink has shifted to the right, as indi-
cated by the dashed arrow, this is now more likely than in chart (a). In this case, 
behaviour in the narrow reference group is assimilated with behaviour in the wide, 
pro-reform reference group. 
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Source: Author’s  figure. 34  Positive theory formation 
The previous circumstances are a threat for the existence of the collective farm 
and hence the income base and power of the manager. He or she can therefore 
undertake steps to avert this ‘farmer threat’ (VAN ATTA, 1993). In our model, the 
manager can either make loyalty more attractive by increasing wages, or influence 
the social reference group of workers by actively limiting their horizon. The latter 
effect is displayed in chart (c), where  0 > θ . In the first place, the pay-offs for 
both loyal and disloyal workers are thereby altered. Starting from the left of the 
chart, disloyal workers who chose independent farming now feel increasingly 
unhappy with their situation the more workers remain loyal. This is not only 
because of diminishing network externalities from private farming, but also be-
cause they feel a marginally increasing discomfort from non-conformity. Loyal 
workers, on the other hand, experience the highest utility loss if the majority in the 
reference group chooses disloyalty. They no longer feel uneasy with their loyalty if 
more and more others are loyal as well. For intermediate values of 
nar λ , loyal 
workers feel a decreasing disharmony with their fellow villagers, and the wage 
line w“ approaches the initial w’ on the right.  
By changing the pay-offs, keeping the horizons limited has another profound effect 
on the regional equilibrium which is very much in the interest of the manager: it 
establishes a second polar equilibrium. Once the majority of workers has decided to 
remain loyal, this process is self-reinforcing, as indicated by the increasing wage 
curve and the additional solid arrow. By stressing the collective identity of workers 
and keeping away any reform-minded attitudes from villagers, the manager can 
establish a stable equilibrium that guarantees the existence of the collective farm. 
Because workers feel comfortable with doing what is, in the community, the 
normal thing to do, they have an incentive to choose loyalty if the majority did 
so already. With regard to workers’ pay-off, however, the polar loyalty equilib-
rium as drawn in chart (c) is inefficient as compared to the full de-collectivisation 
outcome. Even so, because limiting the horizon shifts the kink of the pay-off curve 
back to the left, it makes it even more likely that a loyalty equilibrium occurs.  
2.5  Testable implications and empirical evidence 
Given our basic assumptions concerning social interaction effects among workers 
and managers’ incentives to keep horizons limited, the model provides a number 
of testable implications: 
1.  Within a pool of regions with comparable social and geographical characteris-
tics, there are either regions which totally de-collectivise, so that there are no 
loyal farm workers and a widespread establishment of private farms, or regions 
which keep collectives completely intact, so that there are only loyal farm 
workers and a ‘loyalty culture’ persists. Because only polar reform equilibria  
are stable, there will be no intermediate or mixed restructuring outcomes,  
ceteris paribus.   Positive theory formation  35 
2. Persisting loyalty equilibria can only be overcome if a sufficient number of 
workers decide to leave the collective farm, utilise the network externalities 
in private farming posited by the model and thus ‘jump’ over the kink in the 
pay-off curve. If managers keep horizons limited, marginal improvements in 
the relative returns to independent farming have no effect on workers’ loyalty.  
3. Depending on the relative costs of monetary incentives vis-à-vis limiting 
horizons in a given locality, managers use different mechanisms to elicit loyalty. 
Where costs of sequestering villagers from external influences are lower, 
managers will – ceteris paribus – reduce wage levels and more strongly keep 
horizons limited. Where keeping horizons becomes exceedingly costly because 
widespread access to information and unambiguous reform policies ease co-
ordination on a de-collectivisation equilibrium, collective farms will dismantle 
unless managers are able to offer higher wages. 
In the following, we present some evidence that is consistent with these implica-
tions. Because there has been little systematic research on the relevance of social 
interaction effects in our context, the results are tentative and more detailed empiri-
cal treatments remain for future work.
28 To ensure consistency with the reform 
choice as specified in the model, we focus on countries with redistributive de-
collectivisation policies, as opposed to countries that opted for restitution to former 
owners (for details see LERMAN et al., 2004, pp. 85-93; ROZELLE and SWINNEN, 
2004, pp. 421-429). In a simplifying view, asset redistribution, at least formally, 
provided a fairly large but well-defined group of rural residents the option to ap-
propriate a share of formerly socialised assets. It was practised in all CIS countries 
and in some Central European countries, notably in Albania. Restitution, on the 
other hand, restricted the group of eligible recipients and introduced former and 
possibly absentee owners or their heirs as additional stakeholders. This mode of 
restructuring prevailed in most other European transition countries. However, the 
more complex conflicts of interest in asset restitution have not been incorporated 
in the model so far.  
2.5.1  Duality of reform outcomes in former Soviet countries 
A first piece of evidence that is broadly consistent with the hypothesis of polar 
de-collectivisation results comes from a simple comparison of reform patterns in 
Table 2-1. All countries given in the table started from the Soviet model of 
large-scale collective and state farms, which usually allowed individual farming 
only in the form of subsidiary household plots. In the first group of countries given 
in the table, the overwhelming share of land was individualised already five years 
                                           
28  An alternative would be to rely on micro data concerning individual reform choices and 
directly test the relevance of social interaction effects econometrically (BROCK and DURLAUF, 
2001; FLETSCHNER and CARTER, 2008). The data requirements and methodological subtleties 
of such an approach are challenging, however. 36  Positive theory formation 
after reforms had started.
29 On the other hand, farm restructuring has been almost 
absent in all of the bigger successor countries, where the share of individual 
farms rarely has passed the 20-percent mark of total land use even ten years after 
the start of reforms. Moreover, a large share of this is represented by the millions of 
attached household plots that already existed during Soviet times, and it is unclear 
how much land has simply been abandoned. 
Table 2-1:   Share of individual farms in total agricultural land of some former 
socialist countries (percent) 
  Pre-reform  5 years after start 
of reforms 
8-10 years* after 
start of reforms 
Examples for de-collectivisation equilibria: 
Albania 3  95  n.a. 
Armenia 7  95  90 
Georgia 12  50  44 
Latvia 4  81  87 
Lithuania 9  64  85 
Examples for loyalty equilibria:    
Belarus 7  16  12 
Russia 2  8  13 
Kazakhstan 0  5  24 
Moldova 7  12  20 
Ukraine 6  10  17 
Note:    * Depending on data availability.    
 Source:  Data compilation taken from ROZELLE and SWINNEN (2004, p. 426). 
This broad comparison does not take into account the various differences in initial 
conditions which were present despite a common Soviet heritage and which may 
have explanatory power for reform outcomes. For example, ROZELLE and SWINNEN 
(2004, p. 439) argue that in countries with labour-intensive technologies, indi-
vidualisation yielded substantial gains in technical efficiency and thus induced 
restructuring. However, in line with the theoretical implications of our model, even 
in adjacent regions with similar production conditions, highly different reform 
outcomes emerged. A first example are the orchard, vineyard and tobacco growing 
regions of Transcarpathia, Moldova, the Crimea and parts of Caucasus. These 
continued to be cultivated by corporate farms in Ukraine and Moldova through-
out the 1990s, while a widespread parcellisation took place in the Trans-Caucasian 
                                           
29  Also Georgian agriculture is largely dominated by individual farming. Comparatively low 
figures in the table are due to the fact that a considerable share of land lies idle in former state 
farms, which ceased to operate during the civil war 1992-94 (LERMAN et al., 2004, p. 123).   Positive theory formation  37 
Republics (see KEGEL, 1997 for Georgia). A second examples is the Baltic dairying 
and pig rearing region. This most western region of the Russian forest zone now 
covers Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Northern Ukraine (STADELBAUER, 1996, 
p. 481). Whereas production is still dominated by collective farm successors in 
the latter two countries, individualisation has progressed substantially in the Baltic 
countries (MEYERS and KAZLAUSKIENE, 1998).
30 
In addition, it would be desirable to have cases of varying reform patterns within 
one of the newly emerged countries, which appears to be most promising in the 
land-rich countries such as Russia and Ukraine. Although there are certain regional 
variations in terms of reform outcomes within these countries (see CRAUMER, 
1994 for Russia), the overall picture is one of widespread reluctance to become 
engaged in individual farming (in contrast to household plot production). However, 
UZUN (2005, p. 89) notes that even in Russia there are single islands of radical 
de-collectivisation: “In Saratov Oblast, the agriculture in some districts is ‘totally 
individualized’: all the corporate farms have been liquidated and their land and 
assets have passed to peasant farmers.” This finding supports our hypothesis of 
polar equilibria and merits further research into its causes. 
2.5.2 How  de-collectivisation equilibria have emerged 
More direct evidence on the role of individualisation examples and the emergence 
of a critical mass of disloyal workers can again be derived from the countries 
classified as displaying a de-collectivisation equilibrium in Table 2-1. Unfortu-
nately, the literature describing de-collectivisation processes at the local level in 
these countries is very scarce. However, the following examples provide some 
preliminary insights that support the implications of our model. 
KEGEL (1991) is an account of reform processes that took place in the last months 
of the then Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR).
31 At the outset, she notes 
the above-average role of household production in the Georgian SSR compared 
to other Soviet republics.
32 She then describes how, in August 1989, a decree by the 
Republic administration was issued according to which kolkhozes and sovkhozes 
should be liquidated and individual farms be introduced in six raions of the  
Republic. According to the author, this was a move by the government to coun-
teract the notorious inefficiencies in socialised food production of the Republic. 
                                           
30  Contrary to all other countries listed in the table, Latvia and Lithuania implemented a reform 
approach based on restitution to former owners. It seems plausible that a not too distant 
history of family farming or even the appearance of claimants to individual farms that had 
been expropriated under the Soviet regime makes limiting of horizons very costly and coor-
dination on a de-collectivisation equilibrium much more likely. 
31  Georgia declared independence from the USSR on April 9, 1991. 
32  Between 1986 and 1988, household production contributed on average about 47 percent of gross 
agricultural output of the Georgian SSR. For the USSR in total this share was only 26 percent 
(KEGEL, 1991, p. 369, based on official statistics). 38  Positive theory formation 
Decisions on de-collectivisation were to be made by majority vote of the collec-
tive’s general assembly. Contrary to most of the later experience in Russia and 
Ukraine, almost all collectives and state farms in the reform regions were formally 
dissolved by January 1, 1990. As a result of delays in formal land distribution, 
spontaneous parcellisation by single farm workers occurred in spring 1990. KEGEL 
(1991) reports a locally strong demand for land by former workers, as a result of 
which hundreds of individual farms were established in the reform regions. 
This reform pattern exhibits a number of interesting characteristics that are consis-
tent with our model. First, the Georgian public was used to the fact that individual 
production was a major food supplier in the Republic. Furthermore, the power of 
local farm directors was held in check due to the still widely intact hierarchy of 
the Georgian socialist government. Finally, spontaneous individualisation attempts 
provided the examples for the majority of rural dwellers to follow suit, which led to 
a complete break-up of the former collective structures. All this made it prohibi-
tively costly or impossible to keep horizons limited and led to the apparent move 
towards a de-collectivisation equilibrium in these regions. 
A similar description is provided by CUNGU and SWINNEN (1997) for Albania, 
where people had a relatively fresh memory of individual farming at the time of 
the collapse of the communist regime. Because the ultimate collectivisation 
wave had occurred only in 1967, there was still a broad support for family farms 
as an organisational mode. Compared to other socialist countries, the beginnings 
of reform in the agricultural sector which had been initiated by the last socialist 
government were late and superficial. Furthermore, they were orchestrated by a 
severe economic crisis and food shortages in rural areas. In spring 1991 a spon-
taneous break-up of collectives and an illegal appropriation of assets by indi-
viduals gained momentum. This could only partly be controlled by a newly elected 
reform government, which introduced formal restructuring legislation. CUNGU 
and SWINNEN (1997, p. 72) report that, by abusing the liquidation authority given to 
them by the new government, some of the former collective farm managers re-
tained the most valuable parts of assets for themselves, whereas others tried to 
delay the reform process in order to keep their power and privileges. However, it 
was impossible to halt the dismantling process and more than 90 percent of former 
collective land had been distributed to family farms by August 1993. Similar to 
the Georgian case, the fact that individual farming was an accepted way of food  
production, coupled with the spontaneous re-emergence of individualisation 
examples – apparently led by former managers –, made the swift transition to a 
de-collectivisation equilibrium possible. 
2.5.3  Variations in managers’ strategies to keep collectives intact 
We finally look at some evidence on how managers have tried to keep the collec-
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Data on the cost of limiting horizons is not available, we therefore have to rely 
on indirect evidence. 
Based on sociological fieldwork, PERROTTA (2002) analyses the variety of internal 
governance mechanisms that exist despite a structurally similar appearance of 
corporate farms in Russia. A first result is that the farms she surveyed varied in the 
extent to which official share certificates had been issued to farm workers. Her 
analysis directly supports the idea of what we have called limiting horizons (p. 125): 
“There have been significant delays in the actual distribution of legal 
share certificates: this is often said to be due to ‘shortages of paper’, or 
of the necessary funds for printing large numbers of certificates. These 
‘shortages’ often reflect ongoing power struggles between local authori-
ties and federal level policy makers: the former try and pass the cost of 
privatisation on to federal level authorities and/or use the excuse of 
shortages to delay confirmation of changed ownership.”  
She further shows how farm managers use varying mixtures of financial or political 
mechanisms, that is monetary incentives or hierarchical pressure, to ensure survival 
of the collective (pp. 126-7): 
“The other critical factor which distinguishes one collectively occupied 
farm from another is … the personality of the farm director. These lie 
along a spectrum from uncommunicative autocrat to democratic manager, 
responding to the interests of shareholders. If he … wishes to ignore 
the changed status of the members and/or trivialise the meaning of land 
and property share ownership, farm populations usually fail to evince 
any sign of changed attitudes or behaviour. On the other hand, if the 
farm director is enthusiastic and communicative, farm members are 
more likely to explain that ‘the land is now ours, the profit are now ours, 
so it is worth working harder’. … Agricultural wages are excessively 
low throughout Russia. On farms where decisions are made autocrati-
cally by farm directors, members simply complain, and state that they 
are being treated even worse than ‘before’. … The more progressive 
farm director is more likely to acquire and distribute share certificates 
than the autocrat; rents and dividends are more likely to be paid to land 
and property share owners, where their rights are publicly acknow-
ledged.” 
This is consistent with our result that, within the pool of collective farms, trans-
parent decision making and access to information about legal rights go hand in 
hand with financial incentives for workers, whereas wages on farms with highly 
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2.6 Conclusions 
Based on explicit theoretical modelling of social interaction effects among farm 
workers and the hierarchical power relations between managers and workers, we 
have shown how several outcomes of de-collectivisation in former Soviet countries 
can be derived that have been neglected by previous authors. In particular, our 
model provides a rationale for the persistence of widespread support to collective 
farm organisation among workers and managers, despite the availability of a more 
efficient individual farming option. The model explains why managers have an 
incentive to keep horizons of workers limited by sheltering villages from external 
influences and how different loyalty elicitation strategies may be determined. It 
generates polar reform equilibria that have been demonstrated to be largely consis-
tent with the spatial patterns of reform in the group of post-Soviet transition 
countries. 
The presence of limited horizons has implications for the design of policies aiming 
at the establishment of independent farms. Given a loyalty equilibrium, it is not 
sufficient to improve managerial resources and relax factor market constraints 
for prospective individual farmers, as argued e.g. by RIZOV (2003). The effect of 
marginal improvements in individual farm profitability on the loyalty equilibrium 
in our model will be nil. Crucial for reform in the present model is the formation 
of a critical mass of workers who are willing to establish independent farms. This 
could possibly be achieved by support programmes which make loyal farm workers 
aware of the fortune of successful non-loyal workers, which lead to the emergence 
of individual consciousness raisers among the group of loyal farm workers (and 
not only to the spread of disembodied ideas), or which make it more costly for 
farm managers to keep the horizons of workers limited. In other words, a ‘big push’ 
in reform attitudes among workers is a precondition for reaching the full de-
collectivisation equilibrium, which may be induced by a sufficient number of 
positive examples of independent farming in a region. Whether fifteen years of 
stagnation in the non-reforming countries have reinforced or eroded existing 
norms of collective production may be an interesting issue for empirical research.  
In addition to stimulating a critical mass of individual farmers, reform averse 
managers could be compensated for their foregone benefits. However, the exact 
design of such a scheme is likely to be a highly controversial matter, and it remains 
unclear whether managers would indeed exchange their prestige and power for a 
monetary reward. 
Following SCHAFFNER (1995), our theoretical model represents a subtle departure 
from the traditional assumption of exogenous preferences. By keeping horizons 
limited, a manager can shape the social reference group of workers and thereby 
influence what they regard as the normal thing to do. Moreover, the manager can, 
for his or her own benefit, deprive workers of a more productive reform option. 
Workers then evaluate individual farming by referring to their current reference 
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the collective farm. Workers who for some reason escape the limited horizon 
find themselves better off than they thought they would be, and better off than they 
had been. We consider this an interesting and fruitful way of combining economic 
analysis with social psychology and broader ethnographic and sociological   
insights to uncover the power asymmetries prevalent in the post-Soviet country-
side, which may find useful applications in other contexts as well. 
 
  
3  Normative theory formation: 
The heuristic value of social dilemmas in a search for rules 
that secure gains from cooperation  
Perhaps even more than in other economic subfields, traditional welfare theory 
has been regarded as the mainstream reference framework for prescriptive policy 
analysis in agricultural economics. It implies as a normative benchmark the neo-
classical efficiency criterion, according to which the operation of a set of competi-
tive markets yields, under certain conditions, a Pareto-optimal equilibrium outcome 
that maximises the welfare of society. 
Institutional economists have questioned this approach as being unable to provide a 
relevant framework to base policy recommendations on. DEMSETZ (1969, p.  1) 
criticised the comparison of existing institutions with an ideal norm as a ‘nirvana 
approach’ and called for a ‘comparative institution approach’, where the relevant 
choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements. The latter alternative 
has been advocated by less formally inclined authors, such as WILLIAMSON (1996), 
and has found its way into agricultural and rural economics (see e.g. BECKMANN, 
2000; VAN HUYLENBROECK et al., 2004a). However, this literature largely focuses 
on positive analysis and has not developed a systematic normative framework 
informing about the kind of arrangements that are socially desirable.
33 FURUBOTN 
and RICHTER (2005, p. 548) hence suggest that a satisfactory normative frame-
work for evaluating economic institutions is currently not in sight: “… one con-
sequence of the movement into the territory of the New Institutional Economics 
is that we are left without a standard that can be described as comprehensive in 
its applicability and rigorous in its formulation”. An implication of this lacking 
normative framework is that institutional economists have difficulties in contribu-
ting constructively to public policy debates. EGGERTSSON (1998, p. 336) notes:  
“The new institutionalism, so far, has spent most of its energy explaining 
social outcomes, both analyzing the effects of alternative institutional 
arrangements and attempting to explain institutional change. … [B]ut the 
literature seldom offers lessons for government policy, except perhaps 
implicitly.” 
                                           
33  To the extent that it has, this framework has several weaknesses (see the references given 
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In this chapter we challenge the view that institutional economists are left without a 
normative standard. We build upon insights of constitutional economics, an al-
ternative to welfare theoretic reasoning that has not been followed by the main-
stream of institutional economists (BUCHANAN, 1987; PIES, 1996). Central to this 
approach is a distinction between actions on the one hand and the constitution 
that guides action on the other. Within the constitution, actions are solely deter-
mined by individually optimising behaviour. The normative question is posed 
whether there are alternative, preferable constitutional rules that find the consent 
of the involved agents. Due to its focus on very general rules and its emphasis 
on the assent of each individual citizen, the approach may privilege the status-quo 
(BUCHANAN, 2004). Whereas the welfare economic standard tends to be utopian,
34 
constitutional economics might be criticised for being overly conservative. We 
nevertheless are convinced that its democratically motivated focus on individual 
incentive compatibility of arrangements and its emphasis on comparing realistic 
policy alternatives offer a number of valuable insights that can inform a normative 
analysis of sub-constitutional institutional arrangements. 
We propose a theoretical framework that acknowledges the ‘frictions’ present in the 
institutionalist world-view without abandoning all normative aims.
35 The central 
notion of our approach is a social dilemma, such as the prisoners’ dilemma widely 
analysed in game theory. However, compared to game-theoretic analysis which 
examines optimal strategies for individual agents, the focus of our approach is to 
look for institutional arrangements that are desirable for all players. We use the 
social dilemma as a heuristic to search for institutions that secure gains from 
cooperation. This normative institutional perspective is based on the elementary 
insight that gains from cooperation at the same time legitimise institutional reform 
and facilitate its implementation. The new perspective has a number of distinct 
analytical advantages: Using the social dilemma as a theoretical a-priori guarantees 
that the incentives of all involved individuals are systematically taken into account 
and that reform proposals are focusing on realistic alternatives. We therefore 
propose to reconstruct any economic interaction as an existing or repealed social 
dilemma. In this interpretation, the social dilemma represents a unifying, parsimo-
nious framework that allows to identify the normative implications of established 
institutional-economic arguments. Furthermore, it also offers new perspectives for 
institutional economists to participate in public policy debates. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1 we briefly discuss the norma-
tive approach of constitutional economics. Drawing on the latter, we introduce 
                                           
34  For a detailed discussion see chapter 6 on ‘utopian capitalism’ in BOWLES (2004). 
35  This approach has been inspired by various discussions with Ingo Pies, to whom the author 
is indebted for an introduction to a line of thought laid down in PIES (2000; 2001); 
SUCHANEK (2000); and HOMANN and SUCHANEK (2005). His comments were also very help-
ful for structuring the argument in this chapter. The following is based on PETRICK and PIES 
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our own proposal for a social dilemma heuristic in Section 3.2. We move on to 
discuss the strengths and limitations of this approach and its implications for 
economic policy advice. Section 3.3 contains an illustrative application to insti-
tutional arrangements in rural credit markets. Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.1  Comparative normative analysis in constitutional economics 
BUCHANAN (1959) opens a line of criticism of the efficiency notion of neoclassical 
economics on the ground that it employs an inappropriate concept of the policy 
process and applies an idealised evaluation criterion disconnected from the 
wants of individual people. In this and subsequent writings, BUCHANAN first calls 
into question the assumption of a benevolent dictator which is implicit in much of 
the early welfare economic literature.
36 He regards this as a violation of consistency 
in the behavioural assumptions of economic vis-à-vis political analysis. Second, 
he criticises the normative foundation of welfare economics. The comparison of 
a theoretical ideal with reality is supposed to miss the relevant alternatives, and 
social welfare maximisation as a guide for public policy is rejected as undemocratic 
because it ignores the assent of the actually affected people. Third, he claims that 
due to a lacking consent orientation, the problem of implementation of policy 
measures is unresolved in welfare economics. 
BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962) pioneered the rational choice approach to politics 
and thus tried to solve the problem of consistency. The trajectory was to extend 
‘private choice’ to ‘public choice’ and to put homo economicus at work not only 
in private but also in political, and thus ‘non-market’, decision-making. However, 
beginning in the mid 1970s, BUCHANAN (self-)critically realised that the public 
choice approach to work out the consistency problem made it more difficult to 
tackle the normativity and implementation problems: The welfare economics of 
the private sector had been extended to a welfare economics of the public sector, 
and market failure as a deviation from the efficiency ideal was now accompanied 
and reinforced by political failure. Neither economic nor political real-world actors 
were regarded as being capable of achieving a socially optimal allocation of  
resources. As a consequence, the normative orientation function of the efficiency 
criterion was entirely lost. BUCHANAN (1987, p. 585) concluded that a strategic 
re-orientation of research was necessary to cope with this dilemma:  
“We now know that under some conditions ‘markets fail’ when evaluated 
against idealized criteria. … We also know that ‘politics fails’ when 
evaluated by the same criteria. Any positive analysis that purports to be 
of use in an ultimate normative judgment must reflect an informed com-
parison of the working properties of alternative sets of rules or con-
straints. This analysis is the domain of Constitutional Economics.” 
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Constitutional economics changes the neoclassical approach to normativity in two 
fundamental ways: First, it aims at a comparison of realistic alternative institu-
tional arrangements, and second it uses the consensus of citizens as a criterion to 
choose between alternatives. This follows from the idea that both the economic and 
the political domain shall be analysed in an analogous and thus consistent manner, 
however no longer under the ‘maximisation paradigm’ of welfare economics 
but under an ‘exchange paradigm’ of what is called the ‘contractarian approach’ 
(BRENNAN and BUCHANAN, 1985, chapter 2).
37 The market is conceptualised not 
as an allocation mechanism to maximise social welfare, but as a coordination 
process of individual maximisation strategies. It is then useful to distinguish the 
rules of and the moves in the game of market exchange. Whereas market partici-
pants compete over scarce resources in their actions, they have a common interest 
in a market order that enables mutually beneficial trade. The political sphere is 
understood in the same two-stage structure: political entrepreneurs seek their 
self-interest in the polity system, but there is a common interest in the constitu-
tional rules that make up the political order and shape political competition. 
Both in the market and the polity an exchange or contract of mutual agreement 
to the rules is required before mutually advantageous trade within the rules can take 
place. In this analytical framework, the relevant choice is between different rules, 
not outcomes, because under currently given rules outcomes are pre-determined by 
rational behaviour. Moreover, the relevant normative criterion is the consent of the 
involved actors, and not an abstract social welfare. Accordingly, the task of the 
economist is to suggest improvements in rules which can be assented by the citizens. 
‘Since ‘social’ values do not exist apart from individual values in a free society, 
consensus or unanimity (mutuality of gain) is the only test which can insure that 
a change is beneficial.’ (BUCHANAN, 1959, p. 137). 
In line with these conceptual modifications of the neoclassical approach, also the 
basic normative terms are redefined. ‘Efficiency’ is no longer regarded as an ob-
jective, external measure of social desirability, but is completely based on the 
subjective values of the affected individuals, and hence transformed into a process-
internal criterion. It follows that ‘efficiency, as an attribute, is necessarily present 
when there is a demonstrated absence of possible agreed-on changes.’ (BUCHANAN, 
1975a, p. 227). Closely related, the Pareto criterion is now applied to alternative 
sets of (attainable) rules. It is thus useful to speak of Pareto-superior rules instead 
of Pareto-optimal outcomes. 
Against this background, the question emerges whether the proposals for im-
proved rules can indeed be implemented. The constitutional orientation of the 
‘contractarian approach’ is aiming at precisely this point. First, as explained pre-
viously, the focus on rules addresses the interest of all participants in the process 
of mutual trade and not primarily in the distribution of outcomes. Because the 
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more abstract level of rules stresses the general over the particular interest, it tends 
to assure the assent of real-world actors. Especially the earlier constitutional 
economics literature pushed this point to the extreme by limiting its domain to 
the highest possible level of societal rules, the constitution (nomen est omen). At 
this most abstract level, it is reasonable to assume that particularised interests of in-
dividuals are completely subordinated to the general interest and that this ‘veil of 
uncertainty’ enables full individual consent to the constitutional rules (BUCHANAN 
and TULLOCK, 1962; BUCHANAN 1975b). 
3.2  The social dilemma heuristic 
Given the positive insights of institutional economics and the normative concept 
of constitutional economics, we now attempt to develop the nucleus of a norma-
tive institutional economics that exploits the strengths of both approaches but 
avoids their flaws. In the following, we subject the social dilemma to an institu-
tional economics interpretation and then show how it can be used as a policy-
oriented heuristic for both positive and normative analysis of sub-constitutional 
institutions. 
3.2.1  The social dilemma in an institutional economics perspective 
We define a social dilemma as a situation in which, as a result of an unresolved 
conflict, actors as a group do not make full use of their opportunities. Technically 
speaking, it is a situation of human interaction in which the equilibrium outcome 
is Pareto-inferior. Actors in the social dilemma hence remain in a situation of 
collective self-damage.
38 
Situational incentives, i.e. the rules that channel individual moves, can be modified 
in such a way that social dilemmas are overcome. This potential to shape situations 
of strategic conflict by way of institutional reform makes social dilemmas and 
their game-theoretic analysis the central building block for our approach. First, 
by way of the familiar positive analysis, the functioning of institutional arrange-
ments can be studied and reconstructed as solution of strategic interaction prob-
lems. Second, by way of normative analysis, common interests of conflicting 
parties can be identified and be used to evaluate these arrangements. Finally, as 
                                           
38  The classical case of a social dilemma is the equilibrium outcome of pure strategies in the 
one-shot prisoners’ dilemma. However, we are not primarily interested in a specific game, 
but generally in situations that lead to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium outcome. This can arise 
in various contexts. For example, in the one-shot ‘assurance’ game, one of the two equilibria is 
Pareto dominated. In indefinitely repeated games, the equilibrium outcome of frequently used 
games such as ‘chicken’ or ‘battle of the sexes’ may be Pareto-inferior as well (BINMORE, 
1994, pp. 113-117). The structure of the particular game is thus of secondary importance. 
Due to its popularity and simplicity, we continue to take the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma as an 
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will be shown in Section 3.2, an analysis based on the social dilemma heuristic 
can be used to generate arguments which, from a methodological point of view, 
are compatible with Max Weber’s notion of freedom from value (‘Wertfreiheit’) 
and at the same time, from a political point of view, are compatible with democ-
racy.  
In comparison to traditional welfare economic reasoning, an analysis in terms of 
social dilemmas puts emphasis on the following: 
–  Rather than focusing on allocation outcomes that result from the parametric 
reaction functions of individuals, the interaction of behaviour is emphasised. 
The simultaneous existence of both common and conflicting interests is made 
visible. Furthermore, it becomes clear that actors have only partial control 
over outcomes, which can be described as non-intended consequences of 
intentional behaviour. Unexploited mutual advantage can therefore only be 
realised by way of better rules.  
–  The exogenous variables in this model are the individual pay-offs, which 
are hence the control variables for policy action. However, policy is no longer 
guided by the desire to attain the ideal of a perfect market. It rather aims at 
the establishment of an (attainable) institutional arrangement that allows 
the realisation of mutual gains. A comparison with an abstract first-best world 
is therefore avoided.  
–  The opportunity of mutual improvement creates a basis for consensus and a 
common interest in the according rules. This means, however, that all parties 
involved must in fact gain from an institutional alternative and can rely on 
the rule-abiding behaviour of all others. This is the precondition for indi-
vidual assent, and thus a key difference to the welfare economic approach.  
The social dilemma hence captures the basic problem of social order: How can 
potential gains from cooperation be realised by way of institutional reform? The 
fundamental criterion for the normative evaluation of institutional arrangements 
inherent to this structure is that a desirable institution provides all involved ac-
tors with incentives that allow the realisation of mutual gains. These gains at the 
same time legitimise institutional reform and facilitate its implementation. A ‘good’ 
institution hence brings to bear the interests of all affected individuals, who are 
the only source of values in this approach.  
However, our approach makes no commitments concerning the substance of 
these values. In line with BECKER (1976), we treat the rationality assumption as 
a methodological device that allows a useful complexity reduction, instead of 
providing a phenomenological mapping of human preferences. As such, the homo 
economicus construct is a theoretical, pre-empirical a-priori of a situational analysis 
(POPPER, 1967). By assuming that humans typically do not act against their per-
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rationality criterion to evaluate the incentive structures of institutional arrange-
ments.
39 
The choice between alternative sets of rules and the consensus of affected parties 
as the relevant normative criterion are emphasised by both the social dilemma 
heuristic and the constitutional economics approach. Compared to the latter, we 
stress the following advantages of our approach:  
–  The social dilemma heuristic provides an explicit formal framework con-
cerning the specific alternative that can be agreed upon by the involved 
parties. In this sense, the above-mentioned problems of normativity and 
implementation are solved simultaneously. It is not necessary to ensure con-
sent by limiting the choice of rules to the exchange of rights at the abstract 
level of the constitution, where a ‘veil of uncertainty’ prevents exploitation 
by particular interest groups or the most powerful (BUCHANAN, 1975b). In 
the social dilemma, the situational structure is such that achieving the insti-
tutional alternative is beneficial to all participants. Therefore, all involved 
players have a joint interest to change the rules. 
–  Using the formal framework of modern game theory, the relevant alterna-
tives and the strategic interaction of the involved parties can be made trans-
parent. Our approach therefore allows a stronger formalisation of constitu-
tional economics arguments. On the other hand, it emphasises the normative 
aspects of institutional design, which are often neglected by traditional game 
theorists. 
3.2.2  The methodological status of the social dilemma heuristic  
The aim of our approach to normative institutional economics is to provide a link 
between positive reconstruction, normative evaluation, and public policy advice. 
This ambitious task is subject to a number of methodological constraints, among 
which we already mentioned freedom from value and compatibility with democ-
ratic principles. Moreover, it is useful to strip the approach of dispensable as-
pects and to focus on the fundamental problem structure that cannot be reduced 
further. In order to extract the indispensable ingredients of the structure, a problem-
oriented, pragmatic reduction of complexity is required (SUCHANEK, 1994). In 
capturing the essence of the problem under investigation, the structure should be 
precise and simple. Given our intention to use the approach (also) as an argu-
mentation scheme for public discourse, this latter aspect is of particular importance. 
On the other hand, the structure should be sufficiently flexible to allow a methodo-
logically controlled differentiation and application to empirical phenomena. 
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tional) restrictions for individual choice. Examples include imperfect or asymmetric infor-
mation, incomplete property rights, or social norms. For an overview of this style of modelling 
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Based on these considerations, we can formulate the fundamental hypothesis of 
our approach as follows: 
For a normative analysis that aims to be free from arbitrary value judgements 
and compatible with the democratic principle of normative individualism, it is 
useful to reconstruct any economic interaction in terms of social dilemmas. 
Because the dilemma structure captures the essential tension between common 
and conflicting interests in institutions in a precise and simple way, we propose 
that a normative analysis of institutions should begin with a search for dilemma 
structures. The applicability of our approach is conditional on the success of 
such a search. In this sense the methodological status of the social dilemma can 
be characterised as a heuristic of normative institutional economics: It provides 
guidance concerning the search for solutions to the problem of what the charac-
teristics of a ‘good’ institution are and how desirable institutional reform could 
be accomplished.
40 
There is a widespread consensus in the social science literature that social dilem-
mas, in particular the prisoners’ dilemma, are indeed a ubiquitous phenomenon. 
MILLER (1992, p. 35) regards the management of social dilemmas as the single 
fundamental problem of economic organisation. NALEBUFF (1998, p. 89) notes 
that ‘what makes the prisoners’ dilemma so intriguing is its apparent universal 
applicability to business, politics, and everyday life.’ TULLOCK (1985, p. 1079) 
goes one step further in asserting that ‘it is likely that almost all interactions 
between human beings can be drawn as prisoners’ dilemmas.’ We take these views 
as underpinning for our proposal to systematically search for dilemma structures 
in all human interactions. 
There are three natural objections to this suggestion, which we discuss in the 
following to further clarify our approach: (1) not all interaction is characterised 
by mutual defection, which is the equilibrium outcome of a social dilemma; (2) 
unresolved conflicts about the distribution of gains from cooperation may prevent 
the players from escaping a Pareto-inferior situation; and (3) not always is coopera-
tion in social dilemma situations a desirable outcome.  
Ad (1) (Omnipresence of social dilemmas): Of course, not all observed interaction 
is characterised by mutual defection. In particular, voluntary market exchange is 
one of the prime examples of mutually beneficial cooperation, and hence gains 
from trade. But this does not invalidate our argument: We fully agree that there are 
institutional arrangements in the real world that overcome dilemma structures 
                                           
40  We use the term heuristic in a way similar to LAKATOS’ (1970) ‘positive heuristic’ as a set 
of suggestions to direct and develop research further and to provide guidance on how to 
process ‘anomalies’, i.e. facts that at first glance seem to be inconsistent with the theory or 
model within the positive heuristic. ‘The positive heuristic guides researchers toward the 
right questions to ask and the best tools to use in answering them.’ (HANDS, 1993, p. 114).   Normative theory formation  51 
and that allow to gain from cooperation. Governance and control of social dilemma 
situations is the very reason for the establishment of institutions, as has been 
shown by various contributions of the institutional economics literature (see in 
particular the discussion in Section 3.3). What we emphasise is that the underlying 
dilemma structure of interaction keeps on living below the surface of the existing 
institution and remains latently present. Once the institution breaks down, the 
entire set of problems related to the dilemma comes to life again; one could say it is 
permanently ‘lying in wait’ (HOMANN and SUCHANEK, 2005, p. 384). ORDESHOOK 
(1986, p. 235) puts this insight as follows: 
“Often we might not find prisoners’ dilemmas in a specific situation 
or institution because certain rules or traditions evolve to avoid them. 
But this absence of dilemmas does not make an understanding of their 
logic less relevant, because the only way to understand why such rules 
and traditions persist is to discern the dilemmas that arise without 
them.” 
There are various reasons for such a revival of social dilemmas due to the vanishing 
impact of formal or informal rules and institutions (HOMANN and SUCHANEK, 
2005): Conventions, values, and religious norms may erode; existing control-systems 
may become ineffective as a result of imperfect enforcement, evasive activities, 
revolution, or poor government; individuals may gain new scope of action due to 
technological or social innovations. Instantaneously, dilemma structures liven up 
again, and social interaction undergoes a phase of more or less instability until a new 
arrangement of rules is institutionalised. We agree with HOMANN and SUCHANEK 
that in one way or the other all prevalent problems of the real-world – poverty, 
hunger, migration, environmental damage, unemployment – can usefully be inter-
preted in terms of dilemma structures, for which so far no appropriate solutions 
that allow a move to the Pareto-superior equilibrium have been found and imple-
mented. 
In particular, voluntary market exchange crucially depends on the establishment 
and enforcement of basic property rights, otherwise the individuals find themselves 
in a world of anarchy. To overcome this prime example of a social dilemma is 
thus the necessary condition for enabling the socially beneficial working of the 
‘invisible hand’ (TULLOCK, 1985). However, the smooth functioning of competitive 
markets is in no way guaranteed. In fact, market failures have been central to 
economic analysis for decades. After an extensive survey of the sources of these 
‘failures’, namely public goods, externalities, increasing returns to scale, in-
complete information, and unemployment, INMAN (1987, p. 672) concludes 
(emphasis added):  
“A careful analysis of agent behavior in market failure problems reveals 
non-cooperation to be the dominant strategy of each self-seeking, utility-
maximizing player. The generic form of market failures is the Prisoner’s 52  Normative theory formation 
Dilemma game repeated a finite number of times between many strangers. 
The equilibrium strategy in this game is to play non-cooperatively.” 
The central role of dilemma structures for human interaction can be demon-
strated more systematically by referring to a classification due to SCHELLING 
(1960, pp. 88-89). He identifies two limiting cases of interdependent decisions: a 
pure conflict situation with a fixed sum of outcomes as one extreme and a pure 
coordination or common-interest situation with fixed proportions of outcomes 
as the other extreme. Represented on a two-dimensional diagram where the out-
comes for the players are given by the two coordinates of a point, the points of 
the pure conflict display a decreasing line, whereas the points of pure coordina-
tion display an increasing line. All intermediate situations are characterised by 
both common and conflicting interests (mixed motive games). We seek to estab-
lish that the simultaneous existence of common and conflicting interest is the 
typical case of human interaction.
41 This means that at least one pair of points 
denotes a negative slope and at least one pair a positive slope. If one treats the 
absence of institutional regulation as the systematic starting point for analysis 
(BUCHANAN, 1975b), conflicting interests dominate the common interests, as il-
lustrated by the prisoners’ dilemma (Figure 3-1 (a)). If, due to specific situ-
ational circumstances, common interests are completely eliminated, the pure 
conflict case obtains (Figure 3-1 (c)). If, on the other hand, the common interests 
are step-wise strengthened, the prisoners’ dilemma can be transformed into a 
situation where cooperative behaviour is the dominant strategy, i.e. the prison-
ers’ dilemma is repealed (Figure 3-1 (b)). In the extreme case, conflicting inter-
ests are entirely absent, and a pure coordination game results (Figure 3-1 (d)).  
In this view, any cooperating and likewise any competing interaction is based on 
an existing or repealed dilemma structure. Except for the limiting cases of pure 
conflict or pure harmony, cooperation and competition are both characterised by 
the simultaneity of common and conflicting interests. They differ only with regard 
to the dominating interest (PIES, 2001, pp. 182-184). 
 
                                           
41  According to RAWLS (1999, p. 109), human interaction in society ‘is typically marked by a 
conflict as well as an identity of interests. There is an identity of interests since social co-
operation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to try to live 
solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since men are not indifferent as to 
how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pur-
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Figure 3-1:   The systematic place of the social dilemma in strategic interaction 
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Source:  Author’s figure motivated by SCHELLING (1960) and PIES (2001). 
Ad (2) (Role of distributional conflicts in Pareto superior rule changes): Recent 
experimental evidence has supported everyday wisdom that people are not indif-
ferent towards the distribution of gains from a joint endeavour (see e.g. FEHR 
and SCHMIDT, 1999). If this is the case, positive gains for every single player  
may not suffice to assure unanimous agreement to a Pareto-superior institutional  
arrangement. What are the consequences for the usefulness and applicability of 
a social dilemma heuristic? If fair-mindedness and distributional conflicts are  
believed to be relevant in a given context, these convey individual value judge-
ments and as such should be incorporated as additional constraints into the 
situational logic. The growing literature on the subject suggests several ways 
how this may be accomplished. For example, inequality aversion may be modelled 
as a loss of individual utility, which is no contradiction to the unspecified and 
possibly non-monetary utility notion used here. FEHR and SCHMIDT (1999) suggest 
a utility function that accommodates social preferences by punishing the individual 
for pay-off inequalities among players. Another approach is followed by VANBERG 
(1994), who augments individual preferences by a category of ‘subjective   
constraints’ (p. 50), which may reflect the moral disposition of the individual. It 
is important to note that such additional constraints may have fundamental con-
sequences for the underlying structure of interaction. In a game with standard 
prisoners’ dilemma pay-offs, BOWLES (2004, p. 120-121) shows how inequality 
aversion prevents players from exploiting their co-operatively inclined opponents. 54  Normative theory formation 
This effectively transforms the prisoners’ dilemma into a coordination game, 
which in Figure 3-1 implies a move from (a) to (d). In other circumstances, one 
may conceive that seemingly Pareto-superior outcomes are rejected by the players 
because they are incompatible with their fairness norms.  
In our view, the existence of distributional conflicts does not limit the usefulness 
of the social dilemma heuristic for providing a perspective on mutually beneficial 
rule changes, given that all relevant constraints of the particular situation are taken 
into account. It is, however, clear that such subjective constraints may be more 
difficult to modify by agreed-on rule changes than more conventional, ‘objective’ 
incentive structures. 
Ad (3) (Desirabiliy of defection in social dilemmas): Following RAWLS (1999, 
p. 74), society should be conceptualised as a “cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage”, that is “a public system of rules defining a scheme of activities that 
leads men to act together so as to produce a greater sum of benefits.” In terms of 
our approach, good societal rules allow the acquisition of mutual gains from co-
operation. This does not mean, however, that in all games played in society the 
cooperative solution is always the desirable one. Collusion of particularised in-
terest groups may well be to the detriment of third parties and therefore not in 
the interest of society at large. The formation of cartels is a prime example for 
the social undesirability of cooperation in social dilemma situations (NALEBUFF, 
1998, p. 90). However, this is subordinate to the goal of achieving gains from 
trade with actors on the other side of the market. It is thus necessary to apply the  
social dilemma model in a sufficiently differentiated way. We hold it to be a major 
strength of our approach that it indeed allows to shed new light on the role of 
competition as a key institutional arrangement for social cooperation. Market 
competition suggests a situation of conflict between rivals, but it also offers the 
opportunity to engage in mutually advantageous exchange with a third party. To 
acquire this advantage, individuals will be willing to expose themselves to the 
pressure of competition, provided that others are forced to do so as well. There is 
an incentive to form a cartel to escape competitive pressure. However, this would 
imply that gains from cooperation with the other market side cannot be acquired. 
Market participants can therefore agree to a rule that prevents the establishment 
of cartels. Thus, market competition is an example where conflict and the estab-
lishment of a social dilemma situation is desirable to achieve a common societal 
goal (PIES, 2001, pp. 155-176). Undermining collusion or cartellisation (first-
order cooperation) is hence regarded as a way of conflict resolution that can be 
used to achieve gains from trade (second-order or meta-cooperation). 
The social dilemma as a structure is thus normatively ambivalent. The undesirability 
of cooperation in the dilemma can emerge as soon as the group of players immedia-
tely involved is not identical with the group of individuals affected by this game. 
It is here where the shift of the consensus criterion to the sub-constitutional level 
requires a careful analysis of who bears the effects of reform. This illustrates the   Normative theory formation  55 
general principle that the relevant criterion for evaluation is the consensus of all 
affected individuals.  
3.2.3  Implications for public policy advice
42 
The essential insight of the social dilemma heuristic for policy discourse is that 
it allows to see the common interest in situations that are apparently characterised 
by pure conflict. Very often, these conflicts are dominated by controversial value 
judgements. Examples include the dualisms of liberty versus social justice, capital 
versus labour, or profit maximisation versus social responsibility. In these apparent 
value trade-offs, our approach can serve as a grammar of argumentation, as a struc-
turing aid that allows to rationalise political discourse. In particular, it can be used 
for the systematic derivation of orthogonal positions in value-loaded policy debates 
of the democratic public. An orthogonal position means not to take side within 
such a trade-off but to help overcome the very trade-off.  
One of the basic problems of scientific policy advice is that the advisor must avoid 
a positioning within the value trade-off, because otherwise advice would neces-
sarily result in a controversial value judgement which is in conflict with one or 
the other position under dispute. Corresponding to the analysis of strategic inter-
action in the previous section, this value trade-off is displayed by the decreasing 
line of the prisoners’ dilemma in Figure 3-2 (a), which is based on Figure 3-1 (a). 
Figure 3-2:   Value trade-off and orthogonal position in the prisoners’ dilemma 
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Source:  Author’s figure based on PIES (2001, p. 222). 
One possible approach to deal with this value trade-off is based on welfare eco-
nomic reasoning and models the group of addressees of policy advice as a collec-
tive which has a higher common goal, the overall social welfare. The fundamental 
difficulty of this approach is that the actual conflict of interest is not solved. At 
best, it is concealed by the social definition of welfare. As a result, the generated 
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recommendations do not answer the question why addressees should sacrifice 
individual goals for collective goals. 
In the social dilemma heuristic proposed here, advice is sought orthogonally to, 
not as a compromise in the conflict. This is denoted by the increasing arrow in 
Figure 3-2 (b). It requires that the conflicting positions are not taken at face value. 
To the contrary, the one-dimensional perception of the conflict is extended into a 
two-dimensional perception, which allows to identify a common interest apart from 
the dominating conflicting interest. By referring to situational win-win constella-
tions, common and conflicting interests can be simultaneously charged and can 
be located on different levels. Key is the difference between moves in the game and 
rules of the game, or between actions and conditions for actions. The conflict of 
actors’ interest in the game constitutes the common interest in a change of rules 
to achieve a more productive game. Hence, not higher goals, but common goals are 
sought. The common goals are not related to individual action but to the rules that 
coordinate individual action. Based on an alternative set of rules, the Pareto-
superior outcome is identified and the perception of a fixed-sum game is trans-
formed into a perception of a positive-sum game, which implies a move from 
Figure 3-2 (a) to Figure 3-2 (b). 
In summary, the argumentation scheme of a social dilemma identifies a Pareto-
inferior Nash equilibrium as the starting point for rationalising public discourse. 
The lever of advising arguments is not placed – via a concept of social welfare – 
in abstract Nirvana, but – via incentive analysis – in the status quo. Departing 
from a conflict that results from actual behaviour guided by situational incentives, 
we seek to approach rules that improve the incentives to act. Thus, common rule 
interests are the goal from which orthogonal positions in public value conflicts 
are derived and political discourse can be rationalised.  
3.3  An illustrative application: Institutional arrangements on rural credit 
markets
43 
Poor households often remain poor because they do not have access to income-
enhancing resources. Policy makers have therefore paid much attention to financial 
markets in less developed rural regions, traditionally in developing countries but 
recently also in countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are plagued by  
substantial urban-rural disparities. Rural credit markets are often characterised 
by a dual structure of both formal banks and a network of informal institutions 
and arrangements, including interlinkages between credit and product markets, 
credit associations, village moneylenders, and regionally segmented markets. 
                                           
43  The purpose of this section is to illustrate the previously outlined normative approach. It is 
not intended as a representative survey of the literature on rural credit markets. The author 
provides a more substantial discussion of this literature in PETRICK (2004).   Normative theory formation  57 
Rural credit markets are thus a prime example of the economic relevance of 
complex institutional arrangements. In the following we take the problem as a case 
to demon-strate how our approach can be used to analyse and evaluate these  
arrangements in order to derive policy recommendations. 
At the outset, it is instructive to note that until the mid 1980s, rural credit policy 
was dominated by the view that informal finance was something evil that should be 
suppressed and replaced by (governmentally-promoted) formal lending institutions. 
In the centre of the critique was the ‘usurious moneylender’ and his monopolistic 
power. Behind this view was the simplistic notion that long-term, relational credit 
markets function the same way as spot markets for chairs and tables and that all 
that mattered was the infusion of additional, often subsidised funds into rural areas. 
This policy grossly failed and informal finance continued to be an important source 
of funds for households that were rationed by formal lenders. 
As a consequence, the question which policy recommendations can be given to 
overcome credit rationing has been posed anew. Most of the current literature either 
shies away from a theoretically founded answer to this question or clings to tradi-
tional welfare economic reasoning (PETRICK, 2004). But how far does this reasoning 
take? At about the same time when failure of the above policies became evident, 
economists started to develop a new understanding of the complex nature of institu-
tional arrangements on rural credit markets. A central feature of this more recent 
credit market literature is the assumption of an asymmetric distribution of infor-
mation between market participants. Asymmetric information may lead to a sub-
stantial misallocation on credit markets, including an equilibrium excess demand 
for credit (STIGLITZ and WEISS, 1981). The typical welfare economic response to 
such problems of market failure is to consider a tax scheme that restores first-best 
efficiency. This is considered by de MEZA and WEBB (1987), who show that, in 
the case of credit rationing, a subsidy on interest rates may restore the first-best 
outcome under full information. However, they also show that this result is extre-
mely sensitive to the distributional assumptions of the model. Given only relatively 
minor changes in assumptions, rationing may disappear, the result of underinvest-
ment is turned into one of overinvestment compared to the first-best level, so that a 
tax on interest rates would be needed to restore efficiency. In subsequent work it 
has been shown that another slight modification of the model may result into the 
coexistence of credit rationing and overinvestment (DE MEZA and WEBB, 2000). 
It is intuitively clear that, under these circumstances, government intervention 
aimed at encouraging lending to credit-rationed borrowers makes little sense if effi-
ciency shall be restored. 
It can thus be concluded that welfare economic concepts such as ‘market failure’ 
or ‘constrained efficiency’ are of little value for policy formation unless the need 
for institutional policy is explicitly recognised. However, abstract first-best con-
ditions give little guidance how this institutional policy should look like. From our 58  Normative theory formation 
point of view, it is here where appropriate heuristics and theoretical categories are 
missing. 
The alternative approach advocated in this chapter is to reconstruct the credit ra-
tioning problem not as an allocation but an interaction problem. In this respect, 
a helpful classification of the problems of asymmetric information is according 
to the sequence of actions of principal and agent: the lender as the principal must 
(a) ascertain what kind of a risk the potential borrower is (the problem of adverse 
selection), (b) make sure he will utilise the loan properly, once made, so that he 
will be able and willing to repay it (moral hazard), (c) learn how his project really 
did in case he declares his inability to repay (costly state verification), and (d) find 
methods to force the borrower to repay the loan if he is reluctant to do so (enforce-
ment) (GHATAK and GUINNANE, 1999, p. 197). All cases subject the lender to the 
danger of being exploited by the borrower, unless institutional arrangements are 
in place that counteract this danger. In a general view, the problem can be stated as 
a one-sided prisoners’ dilemma (RASMUSEN, 2001, pp. 117-119). Under the as-
sumption that the borrower behaves opportunistically and defaults after he got the 
loan, the lender will not be willing to extend a loan, so that the strategy combina-
tion (default, refuse) is the Nash equilibrium. The productive transaction simply 
does not take place (Figure 3-3).
44  
Figure 3-3:  Interaction on credit markets as a one-sided prisoners’ dilemma 
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Source: Author’s  figure. 
As in the two-sided prisoners’ dilemma, actors fail to acquire gains from coopera-
tion and remain in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. The institutional design is therefore 
unsatisfactory for both of the affected parties, and the central question emerges 
whether there are institutional alternatives that, compared with the status-quo, 
allow an improvement for both players. 
                                           
44  The game is one-sided or asymmetric because the lender really does prefer the strategy 
combination (non-refuse, non-default) to the other outcomes. He refuses defensively, because 
he expects that his cooperative behaviour will be exploited, but not offensively, because he 
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To overcome the dilemma, the new rules must lead to a reduction of the borrower’s 
pay-off for default below the level of the non-default pay-off. An alternative 
contracting scheme to the one illustrated in Figure 3-3, quite common in the deve-
loped world, involves the pledge of collateral on the side of the borrower, which 
can be interpreted as a form of self-bonding of the borrower. Collateral provides 
an incentive for the borrower to repay the loan and signals his credit-worthiness 
to the lender. If collateral is used in order to eliminate the default of borrowers, 
credit rationing will disappear (see the theory review in COCO, 2000). Compared 
to the alternative to get no credit at all, borrowers will agree to this arrangement. 
However, this element discriminates against those who are unable to provide suffi-
cient suitable assets.
45 
The interaction approach also allows a differentiated normative assessment of 
existing informal arrangements, and it is precisely here where alternatives to tra-
ditional types of collateral can be found. This is not the place to develop detailed 
policy recommendations on rural credit, which surely have to be based on a careful 
study of local circumstances. We rather wish to stress possible options which a 
normative approach based on dilemma structures can accommodate. One example 
is the formation of groups of borrowers who are jointly liable and thus have an 
incentive to monitor each other (GHATAK and GUINNANE, 1999). The default option 
for the borrower is punished by peer pressure, which is particularly effective due 
to the social proximity of the group. A second example is where credit exchange 
is tied to other types of transactions, the above-mentioned interlinkage. The most 
well-known is trade credit. Giving credit to trade partners makes private informa-
tion about business activities available to the lender at little cost. Screening and 
monitoring of potential borrowers may thus be greatly facilitated. Furthermore, 
enforcement of loan repayment may be easy by simply deducting it from the goods 
sold to or through the lender (BELL, 1988). These insights have induced a revision 
of thinking about rural credit markets. It is increasingly acknowledged that insti-
tutional reforms do matter for financial development, in contrast to additional funds 
or preferential interest rates (KRAHNEN and SCHMIDT, 1994; BUCHENRIEDER, 2002). 
Formal banks and informal credit arrangements are no longer seen as stereotype ant-
agonisms. The current trend is rather to learn from informal arrangements how  
mutually beneficial exchange can be achieved, and that linkages between both 
should be established rather than destroyed. Microfinance institutions such as 
the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh but also more recent experience in countries 
like Albania or Bosnia-Herzegovina (such as the Albanian Development Fund or 
ProCredit Bank in Bosnia) demonstrate that innovative lending technologies can 
reach poor customers. The much-maligned moneylender is reconstructed as an 
important emergency source of funds, because his unique knowledge of the  
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borrower prevents default and thus allows mutually beneficial exchange that no 
other institution could possibly accomplish (ADAMS, 1992). 
3.4 Conclusions 
Based on considerations of the constitutional economics literature, we have pro-
posed to regard normative economics as the study of human interaction. Central 
to this approach is the search for (changes in) rules that allow the interacting in-
dividuals to secure gains from cooperation. The assent of the affected actors is 
required to legitimise and successfully implement reform. We use the notion of 
a social dilemma as a basic tool for the analysis of economic interaction because 
it captures the tension between common and conflicting interests in institutions 
in a straightforward way. Building on normative individualism, it conforms with 
freedom from value and is compatible with democracy. Furthermore, it serves 
the awareness of the common interest, helps to detect the scope for improvement of 
all involved parties, and suggests institutional reforms which possibly accomplish 
mutual gains. We have shown how it provides a relatively simple but flexible heu-
ristic for the analysis and evaluation of institutional arrangements and the deri-
vation of orthogonal positions in value-loaded policy debates. In this way it has the 
potential to make insights of the established positive institutional economics litera-




4 Quantitative  analysis: 
A hedonic pricing approach to contractual relations in  
agricultural credit markets 
Effective policy support to farmers’ credit access requires a thorough understan-
ding of the factors that influence credit terms for agricultural borrowers in their 
specific environment. Whereas recent theory developments have identified many of 
the principle problems that influence credit market outcomes (Section 3.3 of this 
monograph), quantitative applications have generally been scarce. This is partly 
due to the methodological challenges of such an analysis, and partly due to the spe-
cific data requirements (PETRICK, 2005). MATTHEWS (1986, p. 917) notes:  
“Because economic institutions are complex, they do not lend themselves 
easily to quantitative measurement. Even in the respects in which they 
do, the data very often are not routinely collected by national statistical 
offices. As a result, the statistical approach which has become the bread 
and butter of applied economics is not straightforwardly applicable.” 
In this chapter, we present a micro-econometric analysis of agricultural credit mar-
ket outcomes in Poland that attempts to shed new light on the relationship between 
contractual arrangements and borrowing costs for farmers.
46 In particular, we try 
to identify and evaluate the factors that influence the cost of agricultural bank loans 
in Poland, including current government measures. We consider both nominal  
interest rates and additional transaction costs in the form of bank fees. The empiri-
cal results are taken as a basis for discussing alternative policy options aimed at 
an improvement of farmers’ borrowing terms. The previously outlined challenges 
of such a quantitative analysis are tackled in two ways. First, we develop an in-
novative theoretical framework based on a hedonic market model, common in 
consumer research and environmental valuation, from which we derive a reduced-
form hedonic equation. We interpret the factors that influence borrowing costs as 
‘quality’ components of the credit contract, whose implicit prices are determined 
by market equilibrium and are not under the control of the individual market 
participants. Second, we make use of a unique data set that includes detailed infor-
mation about credit contracts concluded by a sample of Polish farmers in 1999 
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and 2000. This data set allows us to identify the effect of specific contract and 
farm characteristics on interest rates. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1, we present the theoretical 
framework of the analysis. In Section 4.2, some background information on  
agricultural finance in Poland is given. In Section 4.3, the database is presented. 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 comprise the estimation approach and its results. In Section 4.6, 
we use the estimated parameters to simulate a policy reform that replaces factor-
related subsidies by direct income payments, and Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.1  Loan contracts in a hedonic pricing framework 
Hedonic prices were initially developed in the empirical literature on quality measu-
rement; recent applications include the analysis of environmental quality and farm-
land values (PALMQUIST, 1991). According to ROSEN (1974), observed prices of 
differentiated products are explained by a vector of specific amounts of quality 
characteristics associated with each good. BALTENSPERGER (1976) transferred this 
concept to loan markets with a two-characteristic (interest) price function, including 
size and risk of loans. However, risk is still a rather general indicator, and loans 
differ in more than two dimensions. In the following, we analyse how a specified 
set of loan attributes affects the equilibrium price of credit in the framework of a 
hedonic credit market model. This model depicts how interaction between banks 
and farmers leads to a price equilibrium for credit contracts as a differentiated good. 
Banks are assumed to control the following components of a credit contract they  
offer, in response to market information: the credit volume, L, the repayment  
period, T, and a vector of components, C, that measures the likelihood of default 
of the specific loan. These are conveniently captured by the ‘five Cs of credit’ 
(GREENBAUM and THAKOR, 1995, pp. 214-239): collateral (C1), equity capital 
(C2), character of the borrower (C3), economic conditions of the borrower (C4), 
and future debt servicing capacity (C5). There are two further loan contract charac-
teristics that assumedly cannot be changed by the bank. First, it is the efficiency 
of bank management, B. Second, it is the level of government support, G, which 
is assumed to be a part of the loan contract once the farm complies with official 
eligibility criteria, such as carrying out certain governmentally sponsored invest-
ment projects or starting up a new farm. Eligibility for government support is as-
sumed to be an exogenously given attribute of the farm. The farms also have  
available a given technology that can process loans of size L and repayment 
period T, and possess an individually given vector of characteristics C. For the 
moment, it is assumed that all of the mentioned variables are expressed in posi-
tive, real terms. Together they constitute the vector of loan contract characteristics, 
which determines the price of credit r by a hedonic equation, 
r = r(L, T, C, B, G). (4-1)  Quantitative  analysis  63 
On theoretical grounds, nothing can be said about the functional form of (4-1), 
which may be non-linear (PALMQUIST, 1991). However, it is clear that it should 
be monotonically increasing in L and T, as far as they make the loan riskier, and 
decreasing in C, B and G. 
A bank seeks to maximise profits from a single loan by altering the loan charac-
teristics under its control, 
) , , , , , ( ) , , , , ( max
, , ρ π B G C T L K B G C T L r
S
C T L − =  subject to  0 ≥
S π , (4-2) 
where 
S π  is bank profit on a single loan, r(.) is the loan price schedule from 
equation (4-1),  (.) K  is a joint cost function, ρ  is a vector of bank-relevant input 
prices, such as deposit rates and wages of bank officers.
47 (.) K  provides the vehicle 
to make of elements of contract theory tractable for econometric analysis, because it 
formalises the relevance of the properties of contractual arrangements for economic 
outcomes. Equation (4-2) yields first-order conditions requiring that the marginal 
cost of the loan characteristics under the control of the bank be equal to the mar-
ginal characteristic prices in the market. 
The equilibrium loan price schedule results from credit offers of banks and credit 
bids of farmers. The bank’s offer function φ , representing the prices at which the 
bank would make loan contracts available to farmers, will depend on the charac-
teristics of the loan, the desired profit level 
' S π , and the bank-relevant prices, 
) , , , , , ( ) , , , , , , (
' ' ρ π ρ π φ B G C T L K B G C T L
S S + = . (4-3) 
The partial derivative of the offer function with respect to an endogenous charac-
teristic represents the marginal cost of that characteristic and is assumed to be 
non-negative for L and T and non-positive for C, because increasing levels in C 
decrease the default risk for the bank. The bank maximises profits by equating 
the marginal offer prices for the loan characteristics under its control to the mar-
ginal prices for these characteristics in the market. The offer price for the exoge-
nous characteristics is equal to the market price, because at a lower offer price, 
the bank would forego profits, and at a higher offer price, the offer would not be 
accepted by farmers (see PALMQUIST, 1989, p. 25). 
On the demand side, we make the simplifying assumption that there are profit 
maximising farmers who have available a technology g that transforms an 
amount of credit L, after a given gestation period T and together with other inputs, 
into outputs. The amount of credit that can be productively used as well as the 
                                           
47  The model is inspired by a hedonic land market model due to PALMQUIST (1989), where 
additional formal details are discussed. The standard model of a competitive banking sector 
that ‘produces’ loan services is described in FREIXAS and ROCHET (1997, p. 51-57). Due to the 
widespread use of standardised debt contracts in Poland, there is little scope for bargaining, 
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gestation period are assumed to be exogenous to the farmer, who can only decide 
about the level of other inputs:  
0 ) , , , ( = α T L x g , (4-4) 
where x represents the vector of net outputs (if positive,  i x  is an output, if negative, 
it is an input) exclusive of credit, and α  denotes a vector of farmer characteristics 
that influence the production process, such as specific skills. 
We first consider the profit the farmer makes on a given loan, which we call his/her 
variable profit 
DV π  (analogous to PALMQUIST, 1989, p. 24). Variable profit is the 
difference between the value of output and the value of non-credit inputs. Maximi-





x x p π max  subject to  0 ) , , , ( = α T L x g  and  0 ≥
DV π . (4-5) 
This optimisation problem can be solved for output supply and non-credit input 
demand functions. These depend on the net output price vector and the technology, 
but also on the price of credit and therefore on all elements that determine this 
price according to equation (4-1), hence  ) , , , , , , ( B G C T L p x x α = . Substitution 
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By subtracting the farmer’s credit costs from these variable profits, the actual 
profit, 
D * π , is obtained. A farmer’s bid for a particular credit contract will depend 
on the characteristics of the contract, the prices of outputs and other inputs, the 
desired or reservation profit level, 
D π , and the farmer’s skills. The bid function can 
thus be written as 
D DV D B G C T L p p B G C T L π α π π α θ − = ) , , , , , , ( * ) , , , , , , , ( . (4-7) 
The loan characteristics enter the bid function in the same manner as fixed fac-
tors. The partial derivative of the bid function with respect to the characteristics 
is hence non-negative for L and T and non-positive for C, G and B.  
The bid function denotes the willingness to pay of the farmer for a credit with 
specific contractual arrangements. In equilibrium, the increase in a farmer’s bid 
due to a marginal increase in one of the contract characteristics must equal the 
increase in the market price for credit contracts as a result of an increase in this 
particular characteristic. Both banks and farmers take the market price schedule 
as parametric, but the schedule is determined by the interactions of the two 
groups. In equilibrium, supplier and demander are perfectly matched when their 
respective offer and bid functions touch each other, with the common gradient at 
that point equal to the gradient of the market clearing implicit price function, as 
given by the hedonic equation (4-1) (ROSEN, 1974, p. 44). Observations on the 
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another family of bid functions. This reduced-form hedonic equation relates credit 
contract characteristics to credit prices. First derivatives of the equation can be 
interpreted as implicit prices of loan attributes. The subsequent econometric analy-
sis attempts to quantify the importance of the contract characteristics by estimating 
this equation.  
4.2  Agricultural finance in Poland 
In Poland there are two types of lending organisations which specialise in agri-
culture, namely the Bank for Food Economy (Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej, 
BGŻ), and the system of cooperative banks (for an overview see DANILOWSKA, 
2004). The BGŻ was the primary channel for financing state-managed agricul-
ture during the socialist period. There were several attempts to comprehensively 
restructure or liquidate the BGŻ during the 1990s. However, this was success-
fully blocked, inter alia by agricultural lobby groups. Local cooperative banks 
had often been founded prior to World War II, and existed under the umbrella of 
the BGŻ during socialism. In 1990, most of them left the BGŻ to form regionally-
oriented cooperative banking structures. Even so, their reconsolidation remained 
incomplete. Saturation of urban financial markets and the increasing demand for 
banking services in rural areas, for example due to the inflow of direct payments 
under the EU’s CAP, has induced several commercial banks in Poland to com-
pete with the traditional lenders for rural clients. 
Previous studies have shown that Polish rural banks generally tend to be quite 
risk-averse, and thereby maintain a low default rate of loans. As reported in  
PETRICK (2004b), banks closely screen farmers and refuse those whose collateral 
availability, lending history or personal characteristics suggest less than satisfactory 
loan repayment. It seems useful, therefore, to investigate the extent to which these 
factors also influence credit costs for farmers who obtain (some) credit. 
To foster modernisation and structural change in agriculture, the Polish govern-
ment launched a voluminous farm credit programme in 1994, which mainly en-
compasses interest subsidies granted on operational and investment loans (PETRICK, 
2004b). Such ‘preferential’ loans are extended through the existing network of 
banks. In 1999, the year under investigation in this study, subsidies on loans 
amounted to 1.194 billion złoty (zł) (approximately 288 million USD; OECD, 2000). 
After accession to the EU, national credit policy has been continued, but is being 
harmonised with the rural development measures of the CAP. 
4.3 Database 
The data source for the analysis in this chapter is the ‘IAMO Poland farm survey 
2000’, which is a cross-sectional farm survey conducted in three Polish regions. 
The survey was carried out in 2000 and contains data related to the economic 66 Quantitative  analysis 
outcomes of the years 1997-2000. It is based on a random sample of farms in the 
database of the official extension service ODR. Further details on sampling issues, 
organisation of data collection and a reprint of the questionnaire can be found in 
PETRICK (2001). 
The specific strength of this database is that it contains detailed information 
about loans acquired by farmers. In the following econometric analysis we use 
the information available for the years 1999/2000. This includes relevant data on 
interest rates, repayment period, lending source, collateral arrangements, etc., and 
also on bank fees. Fees or provisions are used as instruments in price competition 
between banks, reflect risk adjustments made by the bank, or are simply the result 
of an unbundling of financial services with separate pricing, such as account mana-
gement, advisory services or insurance. Bank fees are sometimes charged on a 
percentage base related to the loan volume (1 per cent p.a. in about 20 per cent 
of loans taken in 1999/2000, 2 per cent p.a. in about 10 per cent of cases), but 
fixed amounts not related to the specific loan size are the rule. The particular level 
of the fee does not depend on the volume or the repayment period of the loan. 
To obtain a meaningful measure of the price of credit, bank fees have to be com-
bined with nominal interest rates. The problem here is that interest payments are 
due on a periodical basis (for example annually), whereas fees accrue only once 
(usually when the loan contract is negotiated). It was however desirable to have 
a single variable representing the total credit rate in a plausible way. We there-
fore chose an internal rate of return (IRR) method for computing this variable, 
following the suggestion in ROJAS and ROJAS (1997). The idea is to compare the 
periodical payments of the borrower (consisting of repayment of the principal 
plus interest) based on the nominal interest rate 
n r  as given in the loan contract, 
with the initial amount borrowed, L, minus fees, ϕ . This yields an annual per-
centage rate denoted r that encompasses both the nominal interest rates and fees. 
For our calculations, we first express all fees in Polish złoty.
48 We then compute 
r as the rate at which the discounted value of all periodical payments  t A  (based 
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) 1 ( ϕ . (4-8) 
In this equation, t denotes the current period and T is the total repayment period 
of the loan. The relation between the calculated annual percentage rate r and the 
nominal interest rate 
n r  as negotiated in the loan contract is 
n r r ≥ . Equality is 
given for  0 = ϕ . It is hence possible to compare the effective interest rates of 
loans with different repayment periods based on this variable. One important ef-
fect of the outlined procedure is that two loans with the same nominal interest 
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rates and the same fixed fee but different repayment periods also differ in their 
effective interest rate. The loan with the longer repayment period will display a 
lower effective interest rate – which is a consequence of the fixed cost character 
of the fee. 
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that interest and principal repayment are 
made in the form of constant annuity payments throughout the sample.
49 Although 
some of the recorded loan contracts divert from this rule (for example because 
interest payments were made in separation from principal repayment), we regard 
the possible inexactness in the calculation of the effective interest rate as negli-
gible. 
Table 4-1 displays descriptive statistics of the annual loan rate calculated as  
explained above, as well as the nominal rate. The average annual loan rate of the 
sample is 9.8 per cent, which is 1.2 points higher than the average nominal rate, 
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Table 4-1:  Description of variables 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Annual loan rate incl. fees (per cent) r  9.80 5.05  3.9 32.9 
Nominal interest rate (per cent) r
n  8.58 4.49  3.9 32.0 
Loan volume (thousand zł) L  29.61 97.60  0.6 800.0 
Repayment period (months) T  25.28 26.80  12.0 120.0 
Total land owned (ha) C11  19.62 34.61  0.4 365.0 
Land as collateral (dummy) C12 0.14  0.35  0.0  1.0 
Machinery as collateral (dummy) C13 0.17  0.38  0.0  1.0 
Crops as collateral (dummy) C14 0.01  0.12  0.0  1.0 
Regular income as collateral (dummy) C15 0.14  0.35  0.0  1.0 
Compensating balance (dummy) C16 0.05  0.23  0.0  1.0 
No collateral (dummy) C17 0.04  0.20  0.0  1.0 
Current interest expenses from previous loans (thousand zł) C2  1.26 4.53  0.0 52.0 
Farm ownership (years) C31  15.07 8.06  0.1 45.0 
Previous client of the bank (dummy) C32 0.89  0.32  0.0  1.0 
Household members work off-farm (dummy) C4 0.40  0.49  0.0  1.0 
Loan purpose: input purchase (dummy) C51 0.77  0.43  0.0  1.0 
Loan purpose: land purchase (dummy) C52 0.05  0.23  0.0  1.0 
Loan purpose: machinery purchase (dummy) C53 0.09  0.28  0.0  1.0 Quantitative analysis  69 
Loan purpose: renovation or extension of buildings (dummy) C54 0.11 0.32  0.0  1.0 
Loan from cooperative bank (dummy) B1 0.79  0.41  0.0  1.0 
Loan from agricultural sector bank (dummy) B2 0.11  0.31  0.0  1.0 
Loan from savings bank (dummy) B3 0.06  0.24  0.0  1.0 
Loan under the government programme (dummy) G 0.57  0.50  0.0  1.0 
Note:   149 observations.  70 Quantitative  analysis 
4.4  Estimating the hedonic equation 
The empirical analysis consists of an econometric estimation of equation (4-1) 
based on the previously described data. The variable on the left-hand side of (4-1), 
the annual loan rate including bank fees, is calculated as described in Section 4.3 
and enters the regression in per cent. Among the right-hand side variables of (4-1), 
the five Cs of credit are partly measured by several variables, which were then 
numbered consecutively by a second digit. Collateral is included as total land 
owned by the borrower (C11) plus a set of dummy variables indicating whether 
a certain type of collateral was specified in the loan contract or not (C12-C17): 
land, machinery, crops, regular income, compensating balance (i.e., a mandatory 
deposit) or no collateral required. The effect of these dummies is measured against 
a residual group of other types of collateral, which were used only sparsely, for 
example jewellery or household assets. Equity capital, or leverage, is measured 
by the volume of interest payments due to loans taken in earlier periods (C2). 
The farmer’s characteristics are captured by the years of farm ownership (C31) 
and a dummy indicating whether the farmer had been a client of the same bank 
prior to the current loan application (C32). The economic conditions of the farm 
are measured by a dummy indicating whether some members of the household 
had off-farm income (C4).
50 The borrower’s future debt servicing capacity is in-
cluded by a set of dummies indicating the purpose of the loan (C51-C54), 
namely input, land or machinery purchase, or renovation/extension of buildings. 
The residual purposes consist mainly of purchase of household assets. Since we 
had no detailed data on banks’ efficiency, we introduced dummy variables for the 
most common lending institutions: (a) the cooperative banks, (b) the govern-
mentally-owned agricultural sector bank BGŻ, (c) the savings bank PKO and 
(d) all other banks (which consisted mainly of other commercial banks). We 
included separate dummies for the first three types of banks (B1-B3), thus 
measuring the effect of borrowing from one of these sources vis-à-vis the fourth 
type. The overall effect of government intervention G is captured by a dummy 
indicating whether the loan was taken under the government subsidy program. 
All variables L, T, C, B, G are listed in Table 4-1, together with descriptive sta-
tistics. Loans taken by the sample’s farmers in 1999/2000 are relatively small on 
average, less than 30 thousand złoty, and are repaid over two years on average. 
Such characteristics suggest that loans were mainly for working capital rather 
than for investment. This is confirmed by the dummies indicating the purpose of 
the loan: 77 percent of the loans were for input purchase. The most frequently 
required collaterals were land and machinery, as well as regular income. Most of 
the applicants borrowed from a cooperative bank, where they had already been 
                                           
50  ‘Economic conditions’ should also include (expectations of) farm-individual price levels. 
However, the price data available showed no significant variation across observations, 
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client, and benefited from a preferential loan. They were strongly established 
farmers as they had on average owned their farm prior to the start of the transition 
period in Poland. The average land area owned by the borrowers was approximately 
20 hectares, which suggests larger farms in comparison to the Polish popula-
tion where the average farm size is 7 hectares. 
As noted earlier, there are no theoretical restrictions on the functional form of 
the hedonic equation. We therefore tested the functional form by using a general 
Box-Cox formulation with a constant transformation parameter for all left- and 
right-hand side variables as a benchmark (GREENE, 2000, pp. 444-453). This is a 
non-linear model that, for certain values of the transformation parameter, en-
compasses linear and log-linear models as special cases. A maximum likelihood 
estimation with algorithmic search for the transformation parameter showed that 
this parameter was not significantly different from zero, implying a log-linear 
functional form. The regression of the log-linear model was then carried out by 
ordinary least squares.
51  t-values were calculated using a heteroscedasticity-
robust covariance matrix. 
 
                                           
51  The initial proposal of ROSEN (1974) was to estimate the hedonic equation as well as the bid 
and offer functions in a two-step approach. However, this procedure raises a number of estima-
tion problems related to identification and endogeneity (see PALMQUIST, 1991, for an over-
view). If only the hedonic equation itself is being estimated, these problems can be ignored, so 
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Table 4-2:   Results of the hedonic regressions 
  Annual loan rate incl. fees r    Nominal interest rate r
n 
Variable Coeff.  t-value Implicit 
price 
 Coeff.  t-value  Implicit 
 price 
Constant 2.465  **  9.028 –    2.178 **  7.559 – 
Loan volume (thousand zł)
a L 0.045  *  1.733 <0.1    0.037   1.544 <0.1 
Repayment period (months)
 a T -0.205  **  -3.075 -0.1    -0.145 **  -2.246 >-0.1 
Total land owned (ha)
a C11 -0.024    -0.696 >-0.1    -0.010   -0.298 >-0.1 
Land as collateral (dummy) C12 -0.007    -0.081 -0.1    -0.048   -0.529 -0.4 
Machinery as collateral (dummy) C13 0.237  **  2.680 2.3    0.172 **  2.222 1.5 
Crops as collateral (dummy) C14 0.413  **  3.439 4.0    0.444 **  3.461 3.8 
Regular income as collateral (dummy) C15 0.138    1.302 1.4    0.159   1.457 1.4 
Compensating balance (dummy) C16 -0.408  **  -3.550 -4.0    -0.398 **  -3.530 -3.4 
No collateral (dummy) C17 -0.149    -1.442 -1.5    -0.154   -1.395 -1.3 
Current interest expenses from previous loans (thousand zł)
 a C2 -0.009    -1.012 -0.1    -0.016 **  -2.055 -0.1 
Farm ownership (years)
 a C31 0.080  **  2.620 0.1    0.069 **  2.321 <0.1 
Previous client of the bank (dummy) C32 0.353  **  3.058 3.5    0.343 **  2.706 2.9 
Household members work off-farm (dummy) C4 0.117  *  1.870 1.1    0.127 **  2.128 1.1 
Loan purpose:  input purchase (dummy) C51 -0.132    -1.138 -1.3    -0.143   -1.157 -1.2 
Loan purpose:  land purchase (dummy) C52 -0.123    -0.615 -1.2    -0.144   -0.729 -1.2 
Loan purpose:  machinery purchase (dummy) C53 -0.038    -0.266 -0.4    -0.024   -0.174 -0.2 
Loan purpose: renovation or extension of buildings (dummy) C54 0.085    0.610 0.8    0.089   0.618 0.8 Quantitative analysis  73 
Loan from cooperative bank (dummy) B1 -0.136    -1.391 -1.3    -0.130   -1.347 -1.1 
Loan from agricultural sector bank (dummy) B2 -0.180    -1.381 -1.8    -0.133   -0.989 -1.1 
Loan from savings bank (dummy) B3 0.197    1.472 1.9    0.107   1.062 0.9 
Loan under the government programme (dummy) G -0.222  **  -4.137 -2.2    -0.224 **  -4.314 -1.9 
F-value (P-value)  4.59 (<0.001)    4.49  (<0.001)  
Adjusted R²  0.337     0.331  
Observations 149     149  
Note:  Dependent variables are in logs. Implicit prices in percentage points, calculated at sample means. t-values calculated from robust covariance 
matrix. 
a Variable enters the regression in log form. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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4.5  Empirical findings on hedonic pricing of loans in rural Poland 
The results of the econometric analysis are given in Table 4-2, the left columns 
reporting results using the annual loan rate including fees, as explained above. 
As a comparison, the right columns display results of a similar econometric es-
timation, but using as dependent variable the (logarithm of the) nominal interest 
rate, that is to say the rate charged to borrowers without accounting for addi-
tional bank fees. 
While the loan volume (L) has no impact on the nominal interest rate, it increases 
the total annual rate that includes bank fees. This can be explained by the fixed 
character of the fees. Regarding the repayment period (T), again the fixed cost 
character of fees leads to a lower annual loan rate for long-term loans, as ex-
plained in Section 4.3. The fact that this effect is also present when the nominal 
interest rate is used is counter-intuitive. It can be rationalised by the fact that 
long-term loans were more heavily subsidised than short-term loans (POGANIETZ 
and WILDERMUTH, 1999, p. 537). 
The collateral variables’ parameters reveal that the most favoured collateral by 
banks is a compensating balance (C16), as it strongly reduces the total and 
nominal loan rates. Machinery (C13) and crops (C14) are the least preferred col-
lateral, as using them, all other things equal, increases the loan rates by 2.3 and 
4.0 percentage point, respectively. Machinery on Polish farms is often obsolete 
(LATRUFFE et al., 2005) and has a low resale value whereas the enforcement of 
crops as collateral involves high costs for the bank, which explains this result. 
When land (C11 and C12) and regular income (C15) are used as collateral the 
rate charged is not affected, suggesting that banks treat these as ‘average’ types 
of collateral. It also implies that there is no systematic interest rate discrimination 
against small farms. The finding that land is not a particularly high-valued type 
of collateral in Poland is recurrent in the literature (LATRUFFE, 2005; PETRICK, 
2004b) and was confirmed in interviews with bank managers. It can be explained 
by low land prices due to lacking demand and banks’ reluctance to enforce claims 
on land because it is regarded as an ‘essential’ asset, in particular for the poorer 
segments of the rural population. The rare case of offering no collateral (C17) has 
no significant effect on interest rates of either type. That the absence of collateral 
does not generally drive up the interest rate is surprising. A closer examination of 
the survey data showed that the share of non-traditional commercial banks in col 
lateral-free lending was particularly high and that these loans were primarily 
extended during the end of the surveyed period. Most of these were working 
capital loans with 12 months repayment period. We interpret this as an attempt to 
acquire new customers by an attractive loan offer that does not involve pledging 
collateral, which was pursued particularly by commercial banks newly entering 
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The parameter of the indebtedness variable (C2) is not significantly different 
from zero in the annual loan rate regression. At first sight, this finding seems 
counter-intuitive because highly indebted farmers are assumed to have a lower 
repayment capacity and are thus usually considered as risky borrowers. However, 
debt levels of Polish farmers have in general been low. Together with the surprising 
fact that being a new client of the bank decreases the interest rate by 3.5 percentage 
point (C32), we interpret this finding as a sign that rural banks have attempted to 
become attractive for new customers from the agricultural sector. Indeed, Polish 
banks started to regard farmers as an increasingly relevant market segment at the 
time when accession to the EU and payments under the CAP promised additional 
liquidity for farmers (DANILOWSKA, 2004). 
The borrowers’ character and economic situation have a strong influence on the 
price of credit. The number of years of owning the farm (C31) has a positive in-
fluence on the total and nominal rates, indicating that young farmers seem to be 
preferred clients by banks. Off-farm work by some of the household members (C4) 
raises the price of loans by 1.1 percentage point on average. This suggests that 
banks prefer households with a major attention on farming activities, whereas 
part-time farmers pay more. This supports the above view that banks display a 
strong sectoral focus on agriculture. 
All loan purpose dummies (C5) are non-significant in both regressions, indicating 
that the loan type does not influence the price of credit. This interesting finding 
implies that, overall, farmers’ likelihood of default is not considered by banks to 
be dependent on how they intend to use the loan. Whereas many Polish farmers 
eventually use part or all of their production loans for consumption purposes (see 
the evidence provided by PETRICK, 2004b), there is no sign that this results in in-
creasing default rates. 
All bank dummies (B1-3) are not significantly different from zero, which shows 
that the classic rural banking sector (BGZ and cooperative banks) does not sys-
tematically demand higher prices than the other banks, despite the absence of re-
structuring in this sector. The finding is supported by case study results which 
demonstrate that traditional agricultural banks usually do not charge additional 
fees for appraising agricultural collateral, and that they regard farmers as par-
ticularly reliable customers (LATRUFFE, 2005). 
Borrowing under the public loan programme reduced the annual loan rate. 
Switching from a non-programme to a programme loan was worth 1.9 percentage 
points in nominal interest rates, and 2.2 percentage points if fees are included. In 
general, the reduction was quite small in light of the difference between subsidised 
and non-subsidised loans that emerges when advertised preferential rates are sub-
tracted from advertised commercial rates. This difference ranged between 17 and 
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into the credit market borrowers who induced higher risk premia and more costly 
screening procedures, so that the subsidy effect was severely diluted.
52 
A comparison of the nominal rate model with the annual loan rate model including 
fees shows the following. In the case that loan components induce higher nominal 
rates, this effect is reinforced when fees are taken into account. If they induce 
lower nominal rates, this is also strengthened. This is evidence against the view 
that fees are used systematically as instruments of active price policy to lower the 
nominal interest rate visible for the customer. They may be simply regarded as an 
additional price component that is subject to the same determinants as the nominal 
interest rate, and hence as a price of supplementary services related to loan de-
livery. 
4.6  Simulated effects of policy changes 
Given the estimated hedonic equation, we simulated the effects of a policy change 
on loan rates that replaces factor-related subsidies by a general income support. 
On the one hand, this reflects the advice given by many economists who regard 
direct transfer payments as less economically distorting. In Poland, it has gained 
momentum in recent years because budget restrictions led the government to cut 
interest subsidies (PETRICK, 2004b), whereas EU accession increased the relative 
importance of direct payments in agricultural policy spending. We simulated 
this policy change by increasing the number of farmers who use a compensating 
balance as collateral, while reducing the number of farmers who take a loan under 
the government subsidy programme. EU direct payments might indeed increase 
farmers’ liquidity so that more borrowers can afford to deposit cash at the bank, 
whereas a reduced government budget for credit subsidies might allow fewer bor-
rowers to participate. 
We simulated how the mean predicted annual loan rate (i.e. including fees) 
changed if the number of contracts in which a compensating balance was deposited 
doubled or tripled. Given the small number of contracts in the sample in which this 
form of collateral was used (5 per cent of observations), it is still only a moderate 
change. Furthermore, we assumed that the same number of contracts dropped 
out of the preferential credit programme, which implied a decrease in participating 
                                           
52  This interpretation would imply that the regression model does not capture all factors that 
are relevant for the determination of the interest rate. Indeed, the R
2 of the model is not so 
high that this can be ruled out. The spread between nominal subsidies and actual effect of 
programme participation as revealed by the regression can then be explained by unobserved 
factors that lead to higher risk premia for borrowers under the program. If all relevant bor-
rower characteristics were really included in the hedonic equation, there is no reason why 
the reduction due to programme participation should be smaller than the nominally applied 
subsidy. Quantitative analysis  77
loans by 10 and 20 per cent, respectively.
53 Table 4-3 shows the effects of both 
of these changes in a (3, 3) matrix. Starting from the status quo in the top left cell 
(no change), moving right shows the effect of increasing the number of contracts 
with a compensating balance, and moving down shows the effect of a drop in 
programme participation. 
Table 4-3:   Simulated changes in mean predicted annual loan rates  
(in percentage points) 
  No. of contracts including a compensating balance 
No. of contracts participating 
in credit subsidy programme  Status quo  Double status quo Triple status quo 
Status quo  0  -0.17  -0.34 
Status quo - 10%  +0.10  -0.07  -0.25 
Status quo - 20%  +0.20  +0.03  -0.15 
Note:   149 observations. Simulations based on estimated parameters of annual loan rate model. 
For explanations see main text. 
As can be expected from the estimated parameters of the hedonic equation, an 
isolated increase in the use of compensating balances lowers loan rates (-0.34), 
whereas everything else being equal fewer programme participants increase the 
average rate (+0.20). More interestingly, the overall effect of a policy reform that 
allows borrowers to deposit cash at the cost of dropping out of interest subsidies 
is beneficial for borrowers. This can be seen in Table 4-3 by moving on the diago-
nal from top left to bottom right, i.e. replacing programme participants by cash 
depositors. On average this slightly reduces the annual loan rates for borrowers 
(-0.15). This simulation suggests that the availability of EU direct payments might 
be adequate to offset the negative impact of a cutback of the interest subsidisation 
programme. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that the hedonic price approach is a useful framework 
for investigating the relationship between lenders and borrowers, and for measuring 
the importance of specific institutional arrangements in a credit market. Collateral, 
lending history, age and farming attitude are borrowers’ characteristics which 
                                           
53  The simulation was done by changing the values of the dummy for compensating balance 
from 0 to 1 for a random draw of observations, and from 1 to 0 for a random draw of contracts 
previously under the government programme. Given these modified variable values, the 
annual rates for the entire sample were then predicted by using the estimated parameters 
for the annual loan rate model as reported in Table 2. The random procedure can be justified 
by assuming that there are no restrictions on receiving direct payments except from being a 
farmer, and that subsidies are cut without significant changes in eligibility criteria. Quantitative analysis  78
were found to influence the cost of credit. However, there is no evidence that small 
farmers pay higher interest rates than large farmers. The analysis also reveals that 
rural banks dislike certain common forms of collateral, such as land, machinery or 
crops, because they are of little value or difficult to enforce in the Polish context.  
The results support the view that banks are quite risk-averse, strongly oriented 
towards agricultural producers, and prefer what VON PISCHKE (1991) calls ‘asset 
based’ as opposed to ‘cash-flow based’ lending: the most liquid and secure forms 
of collateral (bank deposits) are preferred most, and it hardly matters for what 
purpose loans are actually used. Screening procedures are based on traditional 
methods and the entrepreneurial opportunities of a particular farmer appear to 
play a very small role. This may be due to continued or inherited banking prac-
tices stemming from socialism, where an assessment of credited firms did not 
take place, and which was characterised by a structural absence of decision-making 
capacities within bank branches (FEAKINS, 2004). 
Only a few signs indicate that increasing competition and the additional liquidity 
expected to become available in rural areas due to payments under the EU’s CAP 
force banks to increase their competitiveness and customer orientation. Newly 
entering commercial banks have started to offer inexpensive collateral-free loans. 
However, commercial banks have not been able to secure a price advantage over 
the traditional sector banks, which implies that the latter have been able to adjust to 
increasing competitive pressure. On this account, the privatisation of banks may 
not offer much advantage. 
Our analysis confirms that credit subsidies are effective in decreasing the total 
interest rate. However, the impact on interest rates was not found to be large, for 
example in comparison to the effects of the variables related to the form of collateral. 
On the other hand, there is no empirical support for the view that the interest-
reducing effect of the subsidies is compensated by higher bank fees, because in the 
case where additional fees are taken into account the effect of programme participa-
tion is also higher. Nominal loan support was not completely eaten up or even 
turned negative by additional bureaucracy. However, a simulation exercise showed 
that allowing borrowers to utilise more liquid forms of collateral, for example as 
a result of direct transfer payments, may result in lower rates than those obtained 
when participating in the subsidy programme. 
Due to the diversity of institutional settings and varying financial needs in diffe-
rent countries, the empirical findings here cannot be directly extrapolated to other  
regions. However, our approach to a formal econometric analysis informed by 
the theory of economic institutions is of general value. Under the potentially  
restrictive requirement that appropriate data is available, similar studies of markets 
involving complex contractual arrangements in other countries could be easily 
conceived.  
 
5 Concluding  observations 
Instead of a comprehensive synthesis of the monograph, we conclude with some 
observations that emerge from a view across the previous chapters. To what extent 
are the presented attempts to tackle the issues raised in Section 1.3 compatible 
with each other? What can be learnt from a comparative perspective? 
First, giving up the assumption of exogenous preferences as in Chapter 2 will se-
verely shake the foundations of quantitative and even more explicitly normative 
evaluation based on the rational choice model. That individuals are the best judges 
of their own welfare is indeed an assumption in the ‘hard core’ of mainstream 
economics. The entire concept of Pareto superiority endorsed in Chapter 3 vanishes 
once the agents’ subjective assessments become ambiguous. Similarly, implicit 
prices as used by the hedonic model in Chapter 4 lose much of their informative 
content if preferences are malleable in the short run or even manipulated. 
Similar problems arise if power or bargaining asymmetries are considered. For 
example, the conventional Pareto criterion does not take into account the dis-
tribution of a net benefit from rule changes among the agents. As argued in 
Section 3.2.2, interaction partners may reject a Pareto improvement because the 
sharing rule is regarded as unfair. Although there are ways to model these social 
preferences, the space of Pareto superior rule changes clearly shrinks under such 
additional constraints. Note also that power asymmetries among agents in the 
hedonic market model of Section 4.1 are assumed to be absent by invoking the 
concept of a competitive equilibrium on the loan market. 
Most (agricultural) economists would accept the view that the task of the policy 
researcher is to generate arguments for a discourse with private or public decision 
makers or the broader citizenry. However, the analytical tool of rational choice 
modelling is not consistent with such deliberation processes, at least not as 
long as it is still regarded as a ‘realistic model’ of man. In other words, “homo 
oeconomicus does not argue” (VAN A AKEN, 2002). Although several authors 
have suggested affinities between institutional economics and discourse theory 
(Section 1.1), it is still hard to conceive how the strong behavioural assumptions of 
most economic models could be made compatible with, for example, the commu-
nicative rationality of a Habermasian tradition. One possible solution would be 
to bring up a meta-theory of public discourse, in which arguments based on ra-
tional choice reasoning are embedded. This is a field for future research on the 
policy process. Concluding observations  80
As we attempted to demonstrate in Chapter 4, the insights of institutional eco-
nomics can play an important role in informing empirical analysis of agricultural 
policy issues in general, and econometric analysis in particular. Although repre-
sentatives of different schools in institutional economics have claimed at various 
times that their approach is more corroborated by empirical evidence than others,
54 
we are sceptical that a decisive test or even ‘falsification’ of single strands of 
thought is possible (PETRICK, 2004a). After all, the role of econometric analysis is 
to support or cast doubt upon arguments, too, and to serve as a means to stimulate 
probing and criticism in a scientific community. However, in our opinion, there is 
no ‘objective’ method to separate true from false theories. 
We are convinced that institutional economics has much to offer for a theoretically 
informed analysis of agricultural policy problems in Europe. Even so, it will be 
hard to address all weak areas at once and in a consistent fashion. This is not a 
disadvantage. Unresolved issues, as outlined in the previous paragraphs, will en-
sure that a lively scientific debate extends into the future. 
 
                                           
54  For example, see STIGLITZ (1986, pp. 261-263) in favour of formal contract theory and 
WILLIAMSON (2000, pp. 604-607) in favour of transaction cost economics.  
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